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The agricultural sector in Zambia is supported through the government use of public 
expenditure programs to spur the production and subsidize the consumption of key grains 
to stabilize prices. Previous research has documented the effects of public spending on 
agriculture in terms of food prices and food security.  The effects of government 
spending on the trade of key grains, however, is not well understood. As such, there is a 
gap in knowledge regarding the impact of agricultural policy on the agricultural trade. 
The purpose of this study was to determine the impact of Zambian agricultural policy on 
grain trade.  A combination of 2 trust-based theories formed the theoretical foundation of 
this study. These theories included ecology of games theory and Kingdon’s garbage-can 
model. Secondary data were acquired from the Food and Agriculture Organization 
Corporate Statistical Database and Michigan State University. A vector autoregression 
analysis of time-series data covering a 10-year period from 2003 to 2012 showed that 
grain quantities purchased by the Food Reserve Agency significantly impacted grain 
trade (p = 0.000), whereas the Farmer Input Subsidy Program did not significantly impact 
grain trade (p = 0.843). However, the combined effect of these 2 policy instruments was 
found to be statistically significant (p = 0.000). The key finding of this study is that for 
every 1 metric ton purchased by the Food Reserve Agency, grain trade increases by 0.342 
metric tons; whereas for every 1 Kwacha spent on Farmer Input Subsidy Program, grain 
trade decreases by 0.187 metric tons. Positive social change may be achieved through 
recommendations to policy makers to increase appropriations to postharvest management 
and extension to increase tradable volumes and farmers’ income.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
Agriculture is the economic sector that provides food and income to the poor and 
the rich all over the world (Fischer & Qaim, 2012).  Agriculture is also the main source 
of employment for the majority of rural poor people, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, 
where this sector employs “60% of the economically active population” (Meijerink & 
Roza, 2007, p. 4). Agriculture and its allied industries play an important role in the 
livelihoods of people in developing economies, and their multiplier effects spur growth 
“in the non-farm economy” (Meijerink & Roza, 2007, p. 15).  In addition, agriculture 
constitutes an important part of most African countries’ gross domestic product (Omigie 
et al., 2013).  The crucial role that the agricultural sector plays in sustaining livelihoods 
and maintaining social and economic order has attracted the attention of policy and 
decision makers in the public and private sectors. As many African governments continue 
to classify agricultural production and marketing in the domain of public goods, private 
sector operators look for ways to increase investment and make money in this sector. In 
recent years, the real and potential growth of the agricultural sector have attracted local 
public and private investments and led to “a surge of direct foreign investment in 
developing country agriculture” (Hallam, 2009, p. 2).  
However, the search for optimal levels of food production and marketing 
sometimes put governments and the business community on a collision course. Through 
agricultural policy, governments decide on the “trade-off between consumer and 
producer interests” (Thomson, 2013, p. 20). Moreover, governments must decide on the 
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right mix of private and public investments in agriculture. There is still no consensus on 
the level and type of government spending that would foster private-sector-led 
agricultural development; nevertheless, Omigie et al. (2013) found a positive relationship 
between government spending and investment in agriculture.  
African governments support their agricultural sector through input subsidies, 
government grain purchases, and trade restriction (Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012). The 
objectives of these policy instruments rotate around “increasing the production of key 
agricultural commodities, stabilizing prices, ensuring food security, and reducing 
poverty” (Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012, p. 19). 
The application of these policy instruments has had both positive and negative 
impact on the agricultural sector and its different actors such as farmers, input dealers, 
and grain traders.  Subsidies are credited with having increased agricultural production 
and stabilized food prices in some African and many Asian countries (Odozi & 
Omonona, 2012). However, in some instances, subsidies have had negative effects on the 
performance of agribusinesses. Subsidies programs that were designed and implemented 
without the participation of the private sector had crowding-out effects on private sector 
investments (Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012).  
Governments face a challenge of designing and implementing business-friendly 
agricultural subsidy programs. The use of vouchers redeemable at private sector input 
outlets has been viewed as an appropriate solution that can contribute to the development 
of private-sector entities involved in input businesses (Banful, 2011). Instruments that 
would crowd in agribusinesses involved in the output market are still are still 
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underdeveloped in Africa. These instruments include the use of commodity exchange 
which is an efficient price discovery mechanism, contract farming that ensures that 
farmers have access to inputs, and agricultural insurance schemes that enable producers 
to minimize their risk exposure (Demeke et al., 2012; Odozi & Omonona, 2012). 
The key assumption in the agricultural sector is that production-enhancing policy 
instruments increase tradable volumes, whereas price stabilization measures may produce 
negative effects on grain traders’ profits (Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012; Jayne & 
Boughton, 2011; Kodamaya, 2011). However, the combined effect of both production-
enhancing and price-stabilizing instruments on grain trading has not been studied. 
To contribute to the policy debate about government intervention in agriculture 
and its effects on key constituencies, I conducted a study on the impact of the Zambian 
agricultural policy on grain trade. This study investigated the relationship between the 
Zambian government’s main agricultural policy instruments and grain trade. The key 
instruments of the Zambian agricultural policy include subsidies for agricultural inputs 
and government spending on grain purchases for its food reserve. Investigation into the 
impact of these instruments on grain trade provided insights for public policy makers on 
whether the existing dispensations and practices have enabling or debilitating effects on 
international grain trade. The findings of this study may inform subsequent policy 
decisions that Zambian government officials make to achieve the goal of building a 
private-sector-led agricultural sector (Tembo, Chapoto, Jayne, & Weber, 2009). 
This chapter provides information on the study background through the lens of 
agricultural political economy in Zambia, a description of the problem under study, and 
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the purpose of this research. This chapter also contains a discussion of the theoretical 
underpinnings of the study, its variables, limitations, delimitation, assumptions, and its 
contribution to positive social change. 
Background to the Study 
The agricultural sector employs one third of Africans and sustains the livelihood 
of 70% of rural dwellers (Bates & Block, 2013). Meijerink and Roza (2007) estimated 
that “in Sub-Saharan Africa, 60% of economically active population works in the 
agricultural sector” (p. 4). The importance of this sector pushes African governments to 
protect it from potentially debilitating competition. Agricultural subsidies constitute the 
main policy instruments that governments use to support the agricultural sector (Ellis & 
Maliro, 2013). The main policy objectives of agricultural subsidies include addressing 
market failure that prevents farmers from recouping their investments in agriculture, 
increase crop production, and strengthen political loyalty of the farming community 
(Banful, 2011; Bates, 2013; Reichert, 2006).  
Agricultural subsidies target both agricultural input and output markets. The 
combination of yield-enhancing technologies and price stability contributed to the 
transformation of the agricultural sector in Asia and Africa (Odozi & Omonona, 2012). 
However, in Africa, agricultural subsidies often lead to market distortion and crowd out 
private sector investments in the agricultural sector (Ciaian, Pokrivcak & Szegenyova, 
2012; Dorward, 2009). This situation led to mistrust between government and private-
sector agribusiness operators. In addition, government interference prevents producers 
and buyers from creating long-term and trust-based business relationships (Tadesse & 
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Shively, 2013). In fact, African agricultural markets function as “flea markets” in which 
there are no trust-based relationships between producers and buyers (Tadesse & Shively, 
2013, p. 1172). The dearth of “repeated transactions” between traders and farmers 
amplifies market failure and leads to “frequent government interference” (Tadesse & 
Shively, 2013, p. 1173). 
The trust between private- and public-sector actors is the sine qua non of 
inclusive and broad-based agricultural growth, as it ensures predictability in the 
agricultural marketplace (Jayne & Boughton, 2011). However, “in recent years the 
agribusiness community has increasingly been viewed as a major cause of social, 
environment, and economic problems” (Porter & Kramer, 2011, p. 1).  This perception 
has contributed to increased government intervention in key economic sectors such as 
agriculture.  In fact, McMichael (2013) advocated for the transformation of “debt 
relations” between agribusiness and farmers into “public subsidy relations” to avoid 
private-sector exploitation of African farmers (p. 697).  
In addition to shielding farmers against price instability and high production cost, 
political interests influence government intervention in directing the allocation of 
resources or factors of production (Zahariadis, 2005). Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) 
suggested that even though “market failure” should be the main guiding hand for 
government intervention, policy analysts and makers should not ignore “political 
equilibrium” for a successful implementation of any policy proposal (pp.189-190). 
Moreover, trade reforms that promote private investments into the agricultural sector do 
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not guarantee the reduction of “extreme poverty” (Bussolo, De Hoyos & Medvedev, 
2011, p. 2041; Duygan & Bump, 2007).  
Dorosh and Mellor (2013) disagreed with the notion that increased investment in 
agriculture did little to reduce poverty. They argued that it takes a long time for the 
growth of the agricultural sector to have an impact on poverty levels because agricultural 
growth works through prices and employment. These authors insisted that in open 
economies, agricultural production has little effect on domestic prices and could be the 
driving force for the development of other sectors. They basic assumption is that massive 
numbers of farmers with spending capacity can spur growth in nonfarming sectors of the 
economy (Jayne & Boughton, 2011). Barret (2008) also asserted that growth in the 
agricultural sector has assumed reduced importance in a country’s gross domestic 
product, leading to farmers’ “migration out of agriculture” to other sectors with higher 
labor productivity (p. 300). 
Until recently, agricultural finance was an area reserved for the public sector in 
most African countries. The creation of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Program (CAADP) rekindled African governments’ commitments to 
agricultural investments, and the 2007-2008 food crisis prompted private agribusinesses 
to increase their investment in agriculture (Dorosh & Mellor, 2013, p. 429). Grain traders 
and processors have better access to finance than farmers do, so their interest in out 
grower schemes and other input financing schemes may spur an increase in agricultural 
production and lead to poverty reduction (McMichael, 2013). However, government 
agricultural subsidy policies may crowd out private-sector investments because of the 
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lack of transparency and predictability of government policy (Jayne, Chapoto, & 
Chamberlin, 2011). 
The government of Zambia invests heavily in grain production and marketing 
because grains are the staple food for human consumption and animal feed. In 1990s, the 
government of Zambia embraced a free market economy and privatized many state-
owned enterprises (Hansen, 2010). To continue its economic reform, the government 
“stopped subsidizing the production and consumption of maize” in 1991, a decision that 
led to high agricultural commodity prices and subsequent food riots threatening to 
overthrow the government (Chapoto, 2012, p. 3; Poulton, 2014). In order to avoid food 
shortages and high prices for staple foods, the government of Zambia decided to create 
the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) in 1995, and it has continued to subsidize grain 
production and consumption ever since (Dorward, 2009; Kuteya & Jayne, 2012). The 
government tried to solve supply side problems by providing subsidized agricultural 
inputs to farmers. Government subsidies to the agricultural sector “cover price and 
production risks” and aim to increase the production of staple foods, mainly maize, and 
reduce the retail price of maize meal (Odozi & Omonona, 2012, p. 96). The inception of 
FRA was geared toward solving demand problems by providing a guaranteed market for 
farmers’ produce and stabilizing agricultural prices, whereas the main goal of the Farmer 
Input Support Program (FISP) was to increase production, ensure food security, and 
achieve poverty reduction (Mason, Jayne, & Mofya-Mukuka, 2013).  
The combined impact of these input and price stabilization subsidies on 
international grain trade in Zambia has not been investigated. This study fills a gap in the 
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existing literature on the intervention of the Zambian government in the agricultural 
sector. Most studies in this area have focused on the impact of Zambian government 
policies on agricultural production, food prices, and poverty reduction (Chirwa & 
Dorward, 2013; Jayne & Rashid, 2013; Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, & Fisher, 2013; Mason, 
Jayne, & Mofya-Mukuka, 2013). There are no studies that have addressed the 
relationship between government agricultural policy and volumes of grain imports and 
exports. 
This study provides an empirical basis for trust building between grain traders and 
the government of Zambia. Trust between these two main actors in the Zambian grain 
value chain has the potential to create synergy, improve the allocation of resources, and 
promote the adoption of an appropriate mix of agricultural policy that improves the 
performance of the agricultural sector (Yang & Wang, 2013). 
Problem Statement 
The agricultural sector is the main source of income, food security, and nutrition 
for the Zambian people. Sustainable and broad-based growth of the agricultural sector 
requires efficient markets and a policy environment that is conducive to private-sector 
investment (Jayne & Boughton, 2011). In fact, stated objectives of the Zambian 
agricultural policy for the period 2010-2015 included “the reduction of production and 
marketing distortions of maize” and “facilitating the growth of the private sector” 
(Tembo, Chapoto, Jayne, & Weber, 2009, p. 60). Despite these promarket intentions, the 
government of Zambia continued to intervene in the agricultural sector through public 
expenditure and regulatory instruments.  
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Input subsidies and food price stabilization policies did not result in the 
production of food surpluses in sub-Saharan Africa (Galtier, 2013). In fact, “a large 
proportion of smallholder farmers are only buyers or net buyers of the main staple grains” 
(p. 75). Mason and Myers (2011) estimated that nearly 50% of Zambian smallholder 
farmers are net buyers of maize. 
This tepid performance of the agricultural sector in countries that spent a lot of 
money on input subsidies and price stabilization prompted the recommendation to use 
market-based solutions. Demeke, Dawe, Tefft, Ferede, and Bell (2012) recommended the 
use of instruments such as warehouse receipt systems, commodity-exchange-related 
contracts such as spot prices and forward contracts, as well as futures and options to 
stabilize prices and strengthen price discovery mechanisms. However, opponents of 
market-based instruments argue that “price volatility is an inherent” characteristic of 
agricultural markets due “market failure” and missing market opportunities (Bell, Dawe, 
Demeke, Ferede, Tefft, 2012, p. 5).  They argue that governments should intervene to set 
up food reserves and use their fiscal policy to stabilize prices. Abbot (2010) argued that 
governments should coordinate their policy actions with the private sector, and that 
government intervention should be rule-based, transparent, credible, and predictable to 
minimize negative effects or loss of livelihood. 
Barret (2008) recommended the combination of public policy instruments and 
private-sector investment to enable farmers to produce “marketable surplus” (p. 300). 
Galtier (2013) argued that any government intervention or subsidy can be “non-targeted” 
or “targeted,” depending on whether policy objectives are meant to protect the consumer 
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or the farmer (p. 77). Input subsidies in Africa tend to be targeted, whereas price 
stabilization efforts become nontargeted (Mason & Ricker-Gilbert, 2012). In any case, 
governments should ensure that their subsidies are temporary, solving market failure, and 
do not have a negative impact on private-sector companies participating in input or 
output markets (Banful, 2011; Gilbert, 2011). 
The impact of Zambian agricultural policy instruments on grain trade has not been 
ascertained yet. All of the research on the government agricultural policy and spending 
has focused on the impact that subsidies had on rural poverty, food prices, and production 
levels (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013; Jayne & Rashid, 2013; Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, & 
Fisher, 2013; Mason, Jayne, & Mofya-Mukuka, 2013). So far, there has been no study to 
determine the effects that Zambia’s agricultural subsidies and other agricultural policy 
instruments such as the export ban, tax expenditures, trade tariffs, and price stabilization 
had on the trade of key grains. The lack of clarity on this issue is both an economic and a 
social problem that may affect sustainable development of the agricultural sector and the 
livelihoods of the Zambian people. Abbott (2010) noted that although researchers and 
policy analysts recommended the “coexistence of both public and private trade,” the roles 
of each of these grain market players had not been delineated (p. 45). A clear 
understanding of how and to what extent actions and policies of these actors in grain 
markets affect each other’s performance must precede the definition of roles and trigger 
events that can lead to government intervention (Gilbert, 2011). This study begins to fill 




Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study is to determine the impact of Zambian 
agricultural policy on grain trade. Studies on Zambian agricultural policy have focused 
on food production, food prices, and poverty reduction (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013; Jayne 
& Rashid, 2013; Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, & Fisher, 2013; Mason, Jayne, & Mofya-
Mukuka, 2013). It is evident that the intervention of the Zambian government in key 
grain markets resulted in a “paranoia effect” (Abbink, Jayne, & Moller, 2011, p. 226). 
The fear of losing money due to government intervention reduced the involvement of 
grain traders in the production and marketing of agricultural commodities. On the other 
hand, the fear of private-sector dominance and the potential for loss of farmers’ 
livelihoods increased government spending on both upstream and downstream activities 
of agricultural value chains (Jayne & Moller, 2011).  
Trust between governments and private- sector operators “may promote 
entrepreneurial activities and spur growth and development” (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2011, p. 
344). However, the extent to which the private sector is affected by the instruments that 
the government of Zambia uses to influence the grain markets has not been studied.  
This study was conducted to detect causal relationships between government 
spending on input subsidies, government grain purchases, and combined volumes of 
grain imports and exports. The study used two independent variables: government 
spending on input subsidies and the quantity of government grain purchases through its 
Food Reserve Agency. The dependent variable was the combination of export and import 
volumes of key grains. 
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research questions influence the design of a study and “focus the purpose of the 
study,” whereas hypotheses show the “predictions the researcher makes about the 
expected relationships among variables” (Creswell, 2009, p. 132). This study investigated 
the impact of the Zambian agricultural policy on grain trade. It sought to answer and test 
the following research questions and hypotheses:  
Research Question 1 (RQ1): What is the impact of the Zambian food reserve 
agency’s purchases on grain trade? 
Null Hypothesis 1 (H01): The Zambian food reserve agency’s purchases 
do not significantly impact grain trade. 
Alternative Hypothesis 1 (H1): The Zambian food reserve agency’s 
purchases significantly impact grain trade. 
Research Question 2 (RQ2): What is the impact of government spending on input 
subsidies on grain trade? 
Null Hypothesis 1 (H01): Government spending on input subsidies does 
not significantly impact grain trade. 
Alternative Hypothesis 1 (H1): Government spending on input subsidies 
significantly impacts grain trade. 
I gathered secondary data about the main policy instruments, including the 
government’s grain purchases and spending input subsidies.  I ran a time-series analysis 
to investigate the causal relationship between these policy instruments and grain trade. 
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Data on grain trade included imports and exports of key grains such as maize and rice. 
All of these data are available from secondary sources. 
Theoretical Framework 
Researchers use theoretical frameworks to place their research studies in context 
as they seek to establish congruence between concepts and observations. Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) asserted that theoretical systems enable researchers to 
explain and predict phenomena through empirical research. I used a combination of trust-
based theories to explain and predict the effects of the Zambian agricultural policy on 
grain trade. These theories included ecology of games theory and the Kingdon garbage-
can model. 
Ecology of Games Theory 
This theory was developed by Norton E. Long in 1958. It addresses the 
interaction between institutions, also referred to as games, that pursue different interests, 
and how “players in each game make use of players in the others for their particular 
purposes” (Long, 1958, p. 251).  
The prevailing wisdom is that collaboration between institutions reduces 
transaction cost and maximizes policy outcome. Scholars in the policy arena refer to this 
collaboration as “institutional rational choice” and define it as “inclusive decision 
processes that bring together multiple stakeholders, [and] help build networks and trust 
(Lubell, McCoy, & Henry, 2010, pp. 287-288). However, the “ecology of games theory” 
suggests that collaboration between institutions may increase transaction costs as it 
introduces “a new game overlaid on” the existing policy and institutional configuration 
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(p. 290). Policy games are defined as “arenas of competition and cooperation structured 
by a set of rules and assumptions about how to act in order to achieve a particular set of 
objectives” (Lubell et al., 2010, p. 289).  Using this theory, Long (1958) distinguished 
governance polity as a “more contrived artifact” and the economy that can function even 
when unplanned (p. 251). 
The paradigm of competition and cooperation between the activities of the 
agribusiness sector and government socioeconomic policies contributes to the analysis of 
trust-related issues among Zambian grain industry players. In fact, Abbink, Jayne, and 
Moller (2011) argued that the lack of trust between the private sector and the agricultural 
policies of the government of Zambia produced a “paranoia effect” that tends to crowd 
out private-sector agricultural trade and amplify government intervention (p. 3). The 
authors argued that this situation tends to increase the level of public spending on the 
agricultural sector, as the government fears the eventuality of food insecurity if the sector 
is left to other players. 
The ecology of games theory also indicates that collaborative institutions may be 
trapped in the formulation of symbolic policies that are geared to simply “quell political 
discontent” (Lubell et al., 2010, p. 291).  In addition, due to the effects of “institutional 
rational choice,” political survival strategies can direct government spending to areas 
where other institutions can serve more efficiently (Araral, 2009, p. 867). Bates and 
Block (2013) concluded that electoral competition led to an increase in agricultural 
growth in African countries and influenced a policy shift from urban-bias to rural bias. 
However, they did not investigate the effects of this shift on agribusinesses (Bates & 
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Block, 2013, p. 373). Experts argue that public policies create winners and losers as 
governments struggle to strike the right balance between equity and efficiency (Hyman, 
2014). Porter and Kramer (2011) addressed this policy dilemma by promoting “the 
concept of shared value,” which reflects an assumption that policy trust leads to more 
value creation and higher public benefits than government spending alone (p. 66). This 
concept makes a case for inclusive business practice and partnerships between the private 
and public sectors. 
Kingdon Garbage Can Model 
Politicians and public administrators develop and implement public policies in a 
complex environment. In addition to different streams such as problem, politics, and 
policy streams, there is a myriad of stakeholders with divergent goals that make the 
policy formulation process an “organized anarchy” (Kingdon, 2011, pp. 84-86).  
The Kingdon garbage can model helps in framing and contextualizing the 
Zambian government’s intervention in the agricultural sector. This model also helps in 
analyzing and interpreting the impact that government spending has on other “policy 
games,” including trust between agribusinesses and government agencies (Lubell et al., 
2010, p. 289). 
I collected secondary data on grain trade in Zambia and investigated the 
relationship between grain trade volumes and government agricultural spending levels, 
focusing on input subsidies and grain reserve. This research provides additional empirical 
evidence that explains and predicts the indirect effects of the theory of trust in the 
agricultural policy domain.  
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Nature of the Study 
To fill the gaps identified above, I conducted a time-series study to investigate the 
impact of the Zambian agricultural policy on combined grain import and export volumes. 
The study had two independent variables: the quantity of government grain purchases for 
its food reserve agency and government spending on input subsidies. Grain purchases 
were measured in metric tons, whereas government spending on input subsidies was 
measured in monetary terms using the Zambian Kwacha. The study also had one 
dependent variable that consisted of grain trade volumes combining volumes of grain 
importation and exportation. The dependent variable was measured in metric tons and 
focused on key grains, including maize and rice.  
I used secondary data that were published by the Zambian Central Statistical 
Office (CSO) and Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), as 
well as Michigan State University. The data covered a 10-year period from 2003 to 2013.  
I used multivariate time series analysis to analyze these time-series data. Vector 
autoregressive analysis enabled the assessment of causal relationships between the 
variables of this study. 
Variables and Operational Definitions 
 Below are operational definitions of the key variables that I sought to measure 
and analyze in this research: 
Grain Trade 
Grain trading is a step in the agricultural value chain that fulfills the function of 
moving grains from areas of surplus to areas of deficit as dictated by the market 
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fundamentals of supply and demand (Odozi, 2015). Grain traders “play a central role in 
the decisions that producers make about what to grow, where and how, in what 
quantities, and for which markets” (, Burch, Clapp, & Murphy, 2012, p. 10). The 
Zambian grain is traded at both domestic and international markets. The government of 
Zambia controls the supply and demand of grain at the domestic marketplace. The 
government uses both input subsidies and grain purchasing to influence market forces 
and deal with the dilemma of ensuring that food remains affordable in urban centers 
while maintaining incentives for rural farmers to continue the production of key grains 
(Bates & Block, 2013).  
Agricultural trade is usually measured as export plus imports (Brigham, 2011). 
Zambia uses two policy choices to influence the international agricultural trade. These 
policy choices include import substitution and export promotion. It is evident that 
increased export boosts the growth of the Zambian economy (Chimfwembe & 
Seshamani, 2014). This research focused on international grain trade and used data on 
import and export of key grains, including maize and rice. 
Food Reserve 
Governments intervene in the grain market through the creation of strategic grain 
reserve (Mason & Myers, 2013). The main goal of food reserves is to “overcome supply 
shortage in markets as a result of harvest failures or unavailability of international 
supply” (Kornher, Kalkuhl, & Mujahid, 2015, p. 6). In addition, food reserves help 
governments manage price volatility and keep enough stock that can be distributed to 
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people affected by drought, flood, or any events that prevent them from having enough 
food (Galtier, 2013). 
Input Subsidy 
Agricultural input subsidy is one of the mechanisms for transferring public 
resources to producers in order to reduce farmers’ cost of production and encourage the 
adoption of productivity-enhancing inputs such as improved seed and fertilizer (Chirwa 
& Dorward, 2013). Policy objectives of agricultural input subsidies in developing 
countries include “short-term private input market development, replenishment of soil 
fertility, social protection for poor subsidy recipients, and national and household food 
security” (p. 22). 
Assumptions 
 Agrarian societies engage in export when they produce significant surplus. In fact, 
Saverimuttu and Rempel (2004) analyzed the determinants of grain imports and found 
that “a policy that increased the price farmers receive for food crops, relative to the price 
received for export crops, would reduce the need to import food” (p. 534). My study 
assumes grain export and import quantities represent the true image of grain trade. The 
government of Zambia restricts grain trade, especially exports; however, it rarely imposes 
a total ban. It uses export quota to control export volumes. In general, Zambian farmers 
are net buyers of grain; therefore, volumes traded on domestic markets can be misleading 
as farmers sell and go back to buy the same grain from traders, who manage to store and 
speculate with price increase (Mason & Myers, 2011). These dynamics transform many 
smallholder farmers into net buyers because of lack of access or limited access to 
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appropriate storage facilities and risks of incurring high postharvest losses (Armah & 
Asante, 2006). 
Scope and Delimitations 
The government of Zambia uses public expenditure and trade restrictions to 
achieve its agriculture-related goals. This study focused on the two public policy 
instruments that the government uses: spending on agricultural input subsidies and 
government purchases of grains. This means that the study did not investigate the effect 
of agricultural trade restrictions in terms of an export ban or export quota. 
Limitations 
Grain trading, one of the economic activities that dominate the Zambian formal 
and informal sector, has employed many Zambians since 2002 (Resnick & Thurlow, 
2014). However, available data on imports and exports of key grains cover the formal 
sector. This means that the study did not cover occasional or ad hoc, informal grain trade. 
This may affect the external validity of the study, in that the extrapolation of study results 
to the whole universe of grain trade may erroneous. However, the study population is 
implicitly defined by the fact that time-series data assume consistency in grain trading. 
This study used quantitative methods; therefore, it did not capture opinions or 
interpretations of the study population. A “sequential explanatory strategy “of mixed 
methods would have added qualitative data to explain what the numbers revealed 
(Creswell, 2009, p. 211). Qualitative data would have enabled the study to gain insights 
into causal relationships between Zambian agricultural policy instruments and external 
trade volumes. A rigorous time-series analysis of data addressed these limitations. In 
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addition, a political economy analysis included in the literature review helped in 
dissecting the reasons behind specific annual budget allocations and grain purchases. 
Significance 
There has been a lot of research on the impact of agricultural subsidies on 
production, productivity, and poverty in Zambia. However, the impact of the key 
instruments of the Zambian agricultural policy on grain trade has not been ascertained. 
The Zambian government uses input subsidies and price stabilization mechanisms to 
support the development of its agricultural sector. These two instruments are supposed to 
increase the volumes of grain traded.  Saverimuttu and Rempel (2004) suggested that 
export parity pricing boosts local production, which leads to a surplus. However, 
Caracciolo, Depalo, and Macias (2014) found that Zambian agricultural policy forces the 
exit of many international grain traders.  
The best policy outcome makes “at least one person better off while making no 
one worse off” (Mikesell, 2013, p. 22). In the grain industry, government policies may 
affect farmers, traders, and consumers. This research on the impact of Zambian 
agricultural policy on grain trade provided additional empirical evidence to explain and 
predict the indirect effects of the theory of trust embedded in policies regulating the grain 
industry in Zambia. 
This study fills this gap and raises public policy makers’ awareness of the need to 
consider both intended and unintended consequences during the agricultural policy 
making process. The public and private sectors perform complementary functions to 
improve people’s quality of life. Government policies must strike the right balance 
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between equity and efficiency of the marketplace. This research contributes to the 
existing literature about the appropriate role of the public sector and the private sector in 
supporting key sectors of the economy such as agriculture to create value and sustain 
social and economic development.  
Summary 
This study was designed to investigate the impact of the Zambian agricultural 
policy on grain trade. The study used time-series data to detect the relationship between 
grain trade and the level of government involvement in terms of spending on agricultural 
subsidies as well as government grain purchases over a 10-year period. 
This study bridges a gap in the existing literature by focusing on the impact that 
the Zambian agricultural policy has had on grain trade. Prior research focused on how the 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The growth and sustainability of the African agricultural sector depend on private 
sector investments and the ability to sell agricultural commodities to high-paying export 
markets. Zambia shifted its economic policy from import substitution to export 
promotion to accelerate its economic growth. In fact, Chimfwembe and Seshamani 
(2014) found “bidirectional causality between export and economic growth” (p. 14).  This 
means that export causes economic growth and, at the same time, economic growth 
causes export. These authors recommended that the government of Zambia put in place 
policies that promote export because their econometric analysis showed a “stronger 
causality from export to economic growth” (p. 14). However, Caracciolo, Depalo, and 
Macias (2014) asserted that “the unpredictability of the Zambian government policy over 
the last decades has forced the exit of almost two-thirds of the major international grain 
trading firms present in the country” (p. 496). 
The government of Zambia has prioritized the agricultural sector and invests in 
grain production and marketing. Government spending on agriculture has increased the 
production of grains but has not significantly reduced poverty in Zambian rural areas (, 
Burke, Jayne, Mason, & Shipekesa, 2011).  
Past research has investigated the impact of Zambian agricultural policy on food 
security and poverty; however, the impact of this policy on grain trade has not been 
ascertained. A review of existing literature enables researchers to contextualize their 
research topic and “clarify the relationship between the proposed study and previous 
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work conducted on the topic” (Rudestam & Newton, 2007, p. 62). Creswell (2009) 
recommended that the literature review for quantitative studies focus on secondary data 
and information “related to major independent and dependent variables” (p. 44).  
This chapter provides an overview of previous research on the interaction 
between government agricultural policies and the performance or livelihoods of nonstate 
actors. I also discuss existing literature on agricultural policy and its instruments, as well 
as the effect of Zambia’s agricultural policy mix.  
Key sections of this chapter include literature on the impact of public policy, and 
specifically agricultural policy; the context in which the Zambian agricultural policy was 
developed; the scale of government intervention in the agricultural sector; and the 
operations of grain traders. The chapter also shows gaps that exist in the research 
conducted on the impact of Zambian agricultural policy.  
Literature Search Strategy 
Most of the articles cited in this literature review were retrieved from the Political 
Science Complete databases available at the Walden University online library. Sage and 
John Wiley & Sons publications feature highly in this literature review. I also used 
relevant working papers, books, and reports from various institutions. The key search 
words included policy, agriculture, Zambia, grain, and trade. Boolean operators that I 
used to combine search words included AND, OR, and NOT. Most of the peer-reviewed 
articles, books, working papers, and reports included in this review were written in the 




Poverty and Trade Theories 
Theory of poverty. There are several theories of poverty; two of these are 
relevant to political and public policy arenas. These theories include “individual 
deficiencies” and “social phenomena” (Bradshaw, 2006, p. 6). The design and 
effectiveness of interventions to address poverty-related issues depend on the theory that 
dominates the views of policy makers. Proponents of “conservative” views postulate that 
individual deficiencies are the dominant cause of poverty, whereas those who ascribe to 
“liberal” views point fingers at social phenomena (Bradshaw, 2006, p. 6). These views 
influence the choice of antipoverty policies and programs.  
The recent impressive economic growth in Mozambique epitomizes the limits of 
both conservative and liberal views when considered separately. Economic growth did 
not change the status of poverty significantly in Mozambique, where the agricultural 
sector employs “about 80 per cent” of its population (Cunguara & Hanlon, 2012, p. 627).  
Mozambican economic growth hinges on increased foreign direct investment in 
“megaprojects” for the extraction of minerals, infrastructure development, and 
international development aid (Cunguara & Hanlon, 2012, p. 626).  Some development 
partners and donors who represent the liberal theory of poverty argue that the most 
effective strategy for reducing poverty is investing in “health, education, water, and 
roads” (Cunguara & Hanlon, 2012, p. 634). These views led the government of 
Mozambique and its donors to neglect the agriculture sector. On the other hand, Malawi 
and Zambia defied development partners or donor countries and decided to initiate 
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subsidy programs to shore up the agricultural sector. Rickard (2012) asserted that 
“subsidies are one of the most direct ways government can protect citizens from the costs 
of trade using national budgets” (p. 1181). To protect consumers from high prices of 
maize meal, the Zambian Food Reserve Agency offloads its stock to millers at a 
subsidized price (Kuteya & Jayne, 2012). 
The cumulative and circumstantial theory combines both individual deficiencies 
and social phenomena theories of poverty. The cumulative and circumstantial theory of 
poverty involves the argument that “economic, political, and social distortion or 
discrimination” represent the main cause of poverty and that antipoverty programs should 
be complex to address this complex phenomenon (Bradshaw, 2006, p. 10). Addressing 
both systemic and individual-related causes of poverty in agrarian economies requires 
adequate incentives for farmers to adopted yield-enhancing technologies and access 
stable markets.  In fact, Cunguara and Hanlon (2012) noted that “surplus households in 
northern Mozambique that have the assets and favorable conditions to produce much 
more staple food for the market are discouraged from doing so by the instability of prices 
and markets” (p. 626).  
Political economy analysis of policy choices reveals winners and losers of policy 
proposals. Taking a forward-looking approach to poverty analysis to identify “who is 
likely to remain poor in the future,” governments of countries in which agriculture 
employs the majority of people put in place policies that subsidize the cost of inputs for 
smallholder farmers and ensure that they have guaranteed markets for their produce 
(Carter & Barrett, 2006, p. 178). 
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Appropriate targeting is essential for the success of subsidy programs. In Zambia, 
the subsidy program increased total production but did not reduce poverty significantly 
because of lack of surgical targeting (Mason, Burke, Shipekesa, & Jayne, 2011). This 
study brought grain trade into the equation for reducing poverty and investigated the 
impact of such subsidies on grain trade. 
Theory of trade. Trade is the concept of exchanging goods and services between 
entities. This study focused on international trade, which deals with the exchange of 
goods and services between countries. The trade theory is built on the work of Adam 
Smith, as refined by David Ricardo (Birgham, 2011). Most trade theories consider 
absolute and comparative advantage as the basis for free trade among nations 
(Schumacher, 2012).   
Trade increases access to goods and services as it opens economic sectors. In fact, 
trade openness was the basis of the rapid growth in the “South Asian Tigers” countries 
(Birgham, 2011, p. 732). Chimfwembe and Seshamani (2014) found a strong relationship 
between export and economic growth in Zambia. However, Abizadeh and Pandey (2009) 
found that “trade openness had a small and possibly negative effect on the growth of total 
factor productivity for the agricultural sector” (p. 555). This study focuses on the effect of 




Concept of Trust in the Public Policy Domain 
I anchored this study on the “theory of trust” in the public policy domain (Lubell, 
2007, p. 237). The concept of trust integrates two theories of public policy: the Kingdon 
garbage can model and ecology of games theory.  
Kingdon garbage can model. According to this model, public policies are 
developed and implemented in a complex environment. In addition to different streams 
such as problem, politics, and policy streams, there is a myriad of stakeholders with 
divergent goals who make the policy formulation process an “organized anarchy” 
(Kingdon, 2011, pp. 84-86).  
The Kingdon garbage can model helped in framing and contextualizing the 
Zambian government’s intervention in the agricultural sector and the political economy 
of the Zambian grain market. This model also helped in analyzing the impact that 
government spending had on other “policy games,” including trust between 
agribusinesses and government agencies (Lubell et al., 2010, p. 289). 
Ecology of games theory. This theory was developed by Norton E. Long in 1958. 
It involves the interaction between institutions, also referred to as games, that pursue 
different interests and how “players in each game make use of players in the others for 
their particular purposes” (Long, 1958, p. 251).  
The prevailing wisdom is that collaboration between institutions reduces 
transaction costs and maximizes policy outcomes. Scholars in the policy arena refer to 
this collaboration as “institutional rational choice” and define it as “inclusive decision 
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processes that bring together multiple stakeholders, [and] help build networks and trust” 
(Lubell et al., 2010, pp. 287-288).  The institutional rational choice framework enables 
the analysis of “incentives of actors involved, the context that influences their behavior 
and the outcomes of strategic interaction among rational actors” (Araral, 2009, p. 869). 
However, the “ecology of games theory” suggests that collaboration between institutions 
may increase transaction costs as it introduces “a new game overlaid on” the existing 
policy and institutional configuration (p. 290). Policy games are defined as “arenas of 
competition and cooperation structured by a set of rules and assumptions about how to 
act in order to achieve a particular set of objectives” (p. 289).  
The paradigm of competition and cooperation between agribusinesses and 
government socioeconomic policies contributes to the analysis of trust-related issues 
among Zambian grain industry players. In fact, Abbink, Jayne, and Moller (2011) argued 
that lack of trust between the private sector and the agricultural policies of the 
government of Zambia produced a “paranoia effect” that tended to crowd out private-
sector agricultural trade (p. 3). The authors argued that this situation also tended to 
increase the level of public spending on the agricultural sector because those in the 
government feared the eventuality of food insecurity if the sector were left to other 
players. 
Ecology of games theory indicates that collaborative institutions may be trapped 
in the formulation of “symbolic policies” that are geared to simply “quell political 
discontent” (Lubell et al., 2010, p. 291). In addition, political survival strategies can 
direct government spending to areas where other institutions can serve more efficiently 
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due to the effects of an “institutional rational choice” approach to policy making (Araral, 
2009, p. 867). Bates and Block (2013) also concluded that electoral competition led to an 
increase in agricultural growth in African countries and influenced the policy shift from 
“urban-bias” to “rural bias” (p. 373). Bates and Block’s findings support the argument 
that the development of public policies should always take into consideration “political 
equilibria” even when stated policy objectives are to “remove market failure” or 
“correcting distortion” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013, p. 190). 
Experts argue that public policies create winners and losers as a government 
struggles to strike the right balance between equity and efficiency (Hyman, 2014). 
However, the “shared value” theory can help in contextualizing the assumption that 
policy trust leads to more value creation and higher public benefits than government 
spending alone (Porter & Kramer, 2011). This concept makes a case for inclusive 
business practices and partnerships between the private and public sectors. 
Key Variables and Concepts 
Impact of Public Policy 
Development projects and business initiatives have a hierarchy of measurements 
that policy makers and investors track to ensure that a specific policy or program 
achieves its goals and intended impact. Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman (2004) argued that 
“impact theory” defines “the nature of the change in social conditions brought about by 
program action” (p. 64). Impact represents the highest effect that a specific policy or 
program has on the target group or a segment of the population. However, policy or 
program evaluators also assess the relevance and efficiency of the “organizational plan 
30 
 
and service utilizations plan” that the administrators use to implement policies or 
programs (Rossi at al., 2004, p. 64). Policies or programs have two types of indicators 
that enable evaluators to ascertain effectiveness and efficiency: impact indicators and 
process indicators. These indicators enable policy makers to make informed decisions in 
the process of designing, renewing, or discontinuing a particular program or policy.  
Rosenbloom, Kravchuk, and Clerkin (2009) defined policy impact as “the extent 
to which a policy causes change in the intended direction” (p. 349). These authors argued 
that policy impact relates to the causal relationship between policy prescriptions and the 
results of implementing proposed policies. Public policies may result in expected 
outcomes or produce unexpected impacts on the target sector or population. Economists 
and public policy analysts use the “Pareto criterion” to measure or predict the overall 
impact of a policy and ensure that “at least one person is better off from a policy action 
and no person is worse off” (Mikesell, 2013, p. 22).  
However, most research on the impact of the Zambian agricultural policies has 
focused on the effects that these policies have on the food security and poverty of the 
general population, both urban and rural. None of these studies have closely looked at the 
impact that policy instruments have had on the agribusiness sector, especially in the area 
of grain trade. In this research, I looked at import and export data and analyzed the 
relationship between these data and policy instruments that prevailed during each period 




Agricultural policy refers to “the set of government programs directly influencing 
agricultural production and marketing decisions” (Casavant, Infanger & Bridges, 1999, p. 
353). Agricultural policy is one of the public policy areas that impact people living in 
both urban and rural settings, as well as small businesses and multinational corporations. 
In fact, public policy is a tool that governments use to direct investments in different 
areas of the economic and social life of their citizens. Governments use public policy to 
redistribute resources and achieve equity and efficiency (Hyman, 2014; Mikesell, 2013). 
In many African countries, the performance of agriculture affects the survival of 
political figures due to the dominant role that agriculture plays in these countries’ social 
and economic sectors (Bates & Block, 2013). The agricultural sector is the main source 
of income, food security, and nutrition for the Zambian people. Therefore, the production 
and marketing of agricultural commodities take center stage in Zambian social and 
economic policies. The government of Zambia has prioritized this sector by using public 
expenditure instruments to shore up grain production since “the early days of 
independence” (Sitko & Kuteya, 2013, p. 4).  
Contextualizing the Zambian Agricultural Policy  
Chapoto (2012) conducted an analysis of the political economy of the food price 
policy in Zambia that was consistent with Kingdon’s multiple streams agenda-setting 
framework. Chapoto’s account showed the need for a “policy window” where problem, 
policy, and politics converged to create an opportunity for an equitable and efficient 
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agricultural policy (Kingdon, 2011, p. 165). Kingdon argued that public policies are a 
product of multiple streams, including problem, politics, and policy streams. 
Problem Stream 
In 1990s, the government of Zambia embarked on macroeconomic reforms. To 
transition from a planned economy to a market-based economic system, the government 
liberalized economic activities, and privatized many state enterprises. It is in this context 
that the Zambian government “stopped subsidizing the production and consumption of 
maize” in 1991; a decision that led to high agricultural commodity prices and subsequent 
food riots threatened to overthrow the government (Chapoto, 2012, p. 3; Poulton, 2014). 
Furthermore, in order to mitigate the effect of “several drought cycles in 2004” the 
government decided to diversify the agricultural portfolio rather than focusing solely on 
maize (Sichoongwe, K., Mapemba, L., Tembo, G., and Ng’ong’ola, D., 2014, pp. 150-
151). 
Policy Stream 
To avoid food shortage and high prices for staple foods, the government of 
Zambia decided to intervene at both upstream and downstream levels of the grain supply 
chains with a major emphasis on maize. The government created the Food Reserve 
Agency (FRA) in 1996 to solve demand problem by guaranteeing the market for farmers’ 
produce. The original mission of FRA was “hold buffer stocks and dampen price 
variability”; however, the agency became a dominant player in the market and paid a 
price that was above the market equilibrium (Chapoto, 2012, p. 3).  
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In addition to buying farmers’ products, the government introduced subsidies for 
agricultural inputs in 2002. This program started with subsidizing fertilizer and later the 
government added subsidized seed. By the end of the 2012/2013 agricultural season, the 
expanded range of crops benefiting from the Farmer Input Support Program (FISP) 
included maize, rice, sorghum, peanuts, and cotton (Mason, Jayne, & Mofya-Mukuka, 
2013). 
Politics Stream 
During an election year, politicians tend to promise an increase in public 
expenditure on agricultural subsidies. In fact, the government of Zambia scaled up the 
input subsidy program in 2008 following the election of President Banda and spent 
unprecedented amount of money on FISP in 2011 - an election year. Mason and Ricker-
Gilbert (2013) analyzed the distribution and targeting of the FISP program and found that 
from 1991 to 2011, constituencies that voted for the ruling party received more inputs 
than others as a token of appreciation for their votes.  
Election as a Policy Window 
In unitary states, elections can predict the governance and policy options as 
presidential majority in legislative bodies and their allies or satellite parties endorse most 
of the ruling party policy proposals (Tewfik, 2010). This means that policy streams 
(problem, policy, and politics) converge at the election time to provide a policy window 
for the agenda that the governing coalition prefers. Bates and Block (2013) argued that 
electoral competition led to an increase in agricultural growth in African countries and 
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influenced the policy shift from “urban bias” to “rural bias” (Bates & Block, 2013, p. 
373).  
However, Zambian politicians and policy makers seem to embrace a renaissance 
of the premultipartism era policies that focused on keeping agricultural commodity 
“prices low for urban consumers while maintaining remunerative prices for maize 
producers” (Mason, Jayne, & Mofya-Mukuka, 2013, p. 4). This policy alternative may 
become fiscally unsustainable in the long-run and deliberate efforts might be necessary to 
attract private investments in agriculture. 
Scale of the Zambian Government Intervention in Agriculture 
 Common policy instruments that governments use to influence the agricultural 
sector include “price support, direct payments, production controls, and credit” (Bates & 
Block, 2013, p. 366). Zambia uses both supply and demand side instruments to influence 
the production and marketing of agricultural commodities. 
Supply side policy instrument. The government of Zambia spends a significant 
portion of the agricultural budget on Farmer Input Support Program (FISP) that provides 
farmers with subsidized fertilizer and seed for maize, sorghum, and millet.   The 
government uses input subsidies to increase the overall production of staple crops and 
ensure that poor smallholder farmers also participate in the agricultural production.  






Zambian Government Spending on Input Subsidy Program (FISP and Food Security 

















Note. Data from “Zambia’s Input Subsidy Programs,” by N. M. Mason, T. S. Jayne, and R. Mofya-
Mukuka, 2013, Agricultural Economics, 44(2013). 
* Based on budgeted amount. The budget execution takes place in the subsequent year. 
 
Implementation of the Zambian agricultural policy focused on grain production 
and consumption subsidies that crowded out private sector companies (Abbink, Jayne, & 
Moller, 2011). In addition to subsidies and price support, the government uses other 
policy instruments including export bans, trade tariff, and licensing to influence the 
quantities that are sold in domestic and export markets. However, these other instruments 
are not regular and their use depends on lobbying or fear for food shortage (Sitko & 
Jayne, 2011). 
Demand side policy instrument. To ensure that smallholder farmers have a 
guaranteed market for their produce, the government of Zambia put in place a Food 
Reserve Agency (FRA) that is primarily in charge of buying and holding a strategic food 
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reserve. However, the government has been using the agency to provide smallholder 
farmers with a market that pays “pan-territorial prices that frequently exceed prevailing 
market prices” (Jayne & Sitko, 2014, p. 10). 
Table 2 
Grain Reserve Agency’s Grain Purchases 
Season 











        2012 1,046,000 
Note.  Data from The Maize Price Spike of 2012/13: Understanding the Paradox of High Prices Despite 
Abundant Supplies (p. 5), by N. Sitko and A. Kuteya, 2013, Lasaka, Zambia: Indaba Agricultural Policy 
Research Institute (http://fsg.afre.msu.edu/zambia/wp81.pdf). 
 
FRA’s practice of buying maize, rice, and cassava from farmers at a price above 
the market equilibrium crowds out private sector grain traders (Chipoto, 2012). Grain 
trading use market fundamentals of supply and demand to determine the price and 
quantity of commodities they trade. This study clarifies the extent to which the supply 
side policy instruments affect the involvement of the private sector in the Zambian grain 
trading. 
In addition to investigating the effect of each of these two policy instruments, this 
study also investigated the combined effect of these instruments. The table below proves 
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the argument that Bates and Block (2013) advanced on political and policy biases. In fact, 
the data shows that in 2008, the government of Zambian more than doubled its 
expenditure on Farmer Input Support Program (FISP) as the ruling party wanted to attract 
rural voters. The government campaigned on “expanding the share of fertilizer it 
subsidized from 60 to 75 percent” (Resnick & Thurlow, 2014, p. 14).  Data for the 
subsequent election cycle of 2011 suggest that the incumbent wanted to attract the rural 
producer by increasing government purchases to guarantee high prices and increasing 
subsidies on agricultural inputs. 
Table 3 
FRA Purchases and Government Spending of FISP 
Year 






2003 54,846  98.05  
2004 105,279 92% 139.99 43% 
2005 78,666 -25% 184.05 31% 
2006 389,509 395% 204.54 11% 
2007 396,450 2% 492.08 141% 
2008 73,876 -81% 565.12 15% 
2009 198,629 169% 589.01 4% 
2010 883,036 345% 895.39 52% 
2011 1,751,660 98% 500 -44% 
2012 1,046,000 -40% 499.97 -0.01% 
Note. Author’s calculations using data from The Maize Price Spike of 2012/13: Understanding the Paradox 
of High Prices Despite Abundant Supplies (p. 5), by N. Sitko and A. Kuteya, 2013, Lasaka, Zambia: Indaba 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (http://fsg.afre.msu.edu/zambia/wp81.pdf). 
 
Private Sector Involvement 
A sustainable growth of the agricultural sector requires efficient markets and a 
policy environment that is conducive to private sector investment. Abbot (2010) argued 
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that governments should coordinate their policy actions with the private sector, and that 
government intervention should be rule-based, transparent, credible and predictable to 
minimize negative effects or loss of livelihoods. Barret (2008) recommended the 
combination of public policy instruments and private sector investment to enable farmers 
to produce “marketable surplus” (p. 300).  In fact, stated objectives of the Zambian 
agricultural policy include “the reduction of production and marketing distortions of 
maize” and “facilitating the growth of the private sector” (Tembo, Chapoto, Jayne, and 
Weber, 2010, p. 60). However, “in recent years business increasingly has been viewed as 
a major cause of social, environment, and economic problems” (Porter & Kramer, 2011, 
p. 1).  This perception led to an increased government intervention in key economic 
sectors such as agriculture.  In fact, McMichael (2013) advocated for the transformation 
of “debt relations” between agribusiness and farmers into public subsidy relations” to 
avoid private sector exploitation of African farmers (p. 697).  
In Zambia, there are different categories of grain traders ranging from small-scale, 
medium size and corporate traders. Small-scale traders buy grains at farm gate; thereby 
saving farmers’ time and money to transport their grains to the market. Medium size and 
corporate traders provide centrally located infrastructure when small- scale trader deliver 
the grains they buy from smallholder farmers. Medium size and corporate traders also 
offer market opportunity to farmer organizations that aggregate grains and transport truck 
loads to these traders’ warehouses and other storage or aggregation facilities. 
In 2014, there were more than 150 trading entities dealing in grains and members 
of the Grain Traders’ Association of Zambia (GTAZ). GTAZ subdivided its members 
39 
 
into three categories including corporate, medium sized and small grain traders. Studies 
on the Zambian agricultural policy focused on food production, food prices, and poverty 
reduction. Even though it is evident that the intervention of the Zambian government in 
key grain markets resulted in a “paranoia effect” that reduced the involvement of grain 
traders in the production and marketing of agricultural commodities, the effect of the 
Zambian agricultural policy on grain trade has not been determined yet (p. 226). 
Small traders in Zambia become profitable by “rapidly turning around stock” 
(Shepherd, 2012, p. 5). Government policies may slow and accelerate grain traders’ stock 
turnover; thus, affecting the volumes of grains traded on both international and internal 
markets. Whereas government agencies can afford to keep high inventory levels for a 
long time, grain traders must avoid storage costs and increase their stock turnover to 
make money in this business whose profitability depends on volume traded. 
Jayne and Sitko (2014) asserted that government procurement of grain elevate 
farmers’ price expectations and crowds out traders from trading in commodities being 
purchased by the government. However, the same authors showed that traders still play a 
key role in the marketing of key grains especially maize in both “remote” and 
“accessible” areas (p. 10). 
Most corporate grain traders in Zambia target the export market. Brigham (2011) 
noted that “the export of agricultural products is increasingly seen as one of the few 
viable instruments for reducing hunger and poverty in the developing world” (p. 729). 
This notion prompted a shift in the Zambian economic policy from import substitution to 
export promotion in order to accelerate the country’s economic growth. In fact, 
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Chimfwembe and Seshamani (2014) found “bidirectional causality between export and 
economic growth” (p. 14). These authors recommended that the government of Zambia 
put in place policies that promote export as their econometric analysis showed a “stronger 
causality from export to economic growth” (p. 14). However, Caracciolo, Depalo and 
Macias (2014) asserted that “the unpredictability of the Zambian government policy over 
the last decades has forced the exit of almost two-thirds of the major international grain 
trading firms present in the country” (p. 496). 
Table 4 
Rice and Maze Imports and Exports 
Year 
Maize and rice imports 
in metric tons 
Maize and rice exports in 
metric tons 
2003 154059 28236 
2004 35143 87835 
2005 59179 47220 
2006 146318 28521 
2007 13763 201172 
2008 17208 190651 
2009 52515 20343 
2010 17147 59623 
2011 9263 496357 
2012 20616 726987 
Note. Author’s calculation using FAOSTAT data. 
 
Brigham (2011) defined international grain trade as the combination of imports 
and exports of grains. The level of exports and imports is also used to measure “trade 
openness” (p. 731). However, Brigham argues that the effect of imports and export 
should analyzed separately as each on these components of international trade produces 
different effects in different circumstances.  Key considerations must include food 
availability, agricultural labor productivity and the importance of agriculture in the 
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economy. These considerations are important when the dependent variable is food 
security or food insecurity. The dependent variable for this study is the level of 
international grain trade. Therefore, the combination of key grain imports and export is 
appropriate. 
Table 5 
















2003 154059 28236 182295 
2004 35143 87835 122978 
2005 59179 47220 106399 
2006 146318 28521 174839 
2007 13763 201172 214935 
2008 17208 190651 207859 
2009 52515 20343 72858 
2010 17147 59623 76770 
2011 9263 496357 505620 
2012 20616 726987 747603 
Note. Author’s calculation using FAOSTAT data. 
 
Porter and Kramer (2011) urged businesses to partner with host communities to 
create shared value. The creation of shared value depends on the policy environment that 
must encourage wealth creation rather than redistribution of resources. Therefore, 
“governments must learn how to regulate in ways that enable shared value rather than 
working against it” (Porter & Kramer, 2011, p. 64). In fact, the creating shared value 
theory is paradigm shift in the interaction between businesses, government and society. It 
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advocates for “moving beyond trade-offs” and zero sum games that assume that 
providing societal benefits means tempering with companies’ economic success (Porter 
& Kramer, 2011, p. 65).  
The private sector can assist farmers in adopting technologies and practices that 
increase yields and the quality of produce that business buy and process. The intertwined 
interest of farmers and agribusiness companies leads to a “bigger pie of revenue and 
profits that benefits both farmers and companies that buy from them” (Porter & Kramer, 
2011, p. 66). However, the government of Zambia invests heavily in grain purchasing. 
The operations and spending of the Zambian Food Reserve Agency (FRA) have been 
suspected of crowding out private sector companies that are involved in grain trading 
(Gilbert, 2011). 
Trust Among Policy Stakeholders  
Trust is the backbone of market-based economic systems. The state and the 
perception of public sector fiduciary responsibility can lead to boom or bust in the 
marketplace. Successful development and implementation of public policies also depend 
on the trust level between policymakers and stakeholders (Lubell, 2007). In fact, Abbink, 
Jayne and Moller (2011) argue that the Bretton Woods institutions imposed liberalization 
policy to African government in 1980s. These policies led to the transfer of “critical 
marketing functions from state to private traders” and reinforced mistrust between 
governments and private sector operators (p. 208). Policy trust theories can assist the 
evaluation of the Zambian grain market performance in the current policy environment. 
Relevant theoretical frameworks include generalized trust framework, transaction cost 
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framework, advocacy coalition framework, policy stream framework, and creating shared 
value theory.  
Summary 
This review of literature explored what scholars published on the Zambian 
agricultural policy and its impact. The review showed that the government is involved in 
both the production and marketing of agricultural commodities. The government of 
Zambia uses both demand side and supply side policy instruments to influence 
transactions and activities at the upstream and downstream levels of agricultural supply 
chains. 
Scholars who investigated the impact of the Zambian agricultural policy focused 
on food security in its strict sense of food availability and the price of food. They did not 
consider the impact of this policy on grain trade. This study investigated causal 
relationships between applied policy instruments and the volumes of international grain 
trade. The next chapter describes the methodology that this study used to collect data and 
analyze the relationship between input subsidies, government grain purchases, and grain 
trade in Zambia. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the purpose and design of this research, the sampling 
methods, and the data collection and analysis tools. The selection of any type of research 
design is informed by the purpose of a study and the research questions (Creswell, 2009). 
Therefore, this chapter begins with an examination of the purpose of this study. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of Zambian agricultural 
policy on grain trade. Studies on Zambian agricultural policy have been focused on food 
production, food prices, and poverty reduction.  Studies on how key instruments of the 
Zambian agricultural policy impact grain trade are lacking. 
Abbink, Jayne, and Moller (2011) argued that private-sector involvement in the 
grain grade and the intervention of the Zambian government in key grain markets had 
resulted in a “paranoia effect” (p. 226). The fear of losing money due to government 
intervention reduced the involvement of grain traders in the production and marketing of 
agricultural commodities. On the other hand, the fear of private sector dominance 
increased government spending on both upstream and downstream activities of 
agricultural value chains. However, the effect of Zambian agricultural policy on grain 
trade has not yet been determined. To fill this gap, I conducted a time-series analysis of 
existing data on grain trade and government spending on input subsidies as well as grain 
volumes that the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) bought over a 10-year period. Major 
sections of this chapter address research design, research questions and hypotheses, 
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definitions of variables and concepts, assumptions, and the methodology for data 
collection and analysis. 
Research Design and Rationale 
 This study investigated the relationship between two independent variables and 
one dependent variable. The independent variables were government spending on input 
subsidies and grain volumes that the government-run grain reserve agency bought over a 
10-year period. It is important to note that the Zambian Food Reserve Agency always 
buys grain at a price that is above the going market rate (Mulungu & Chilundika, 2016). 
The dependent variable was the quantity of internationally traded grain. This variable 
combined both imports and exports of key grains, including maize and rice.  
This study employed a quantitative method with a time-series design that 
“predicts outcomes retrospectively” (Druckman, 2004, p. 398). A time-series design and 
analysis enable researchers to analyze  
variation in chronological events that occur within cases referred to as diachronic 
variance, focus on trends that may reveal patterns or shapes of change, compare 
trends for two or more cases with the same or different number of data points, and 
use regression and correlational statistics taking into account the correlations that 
exist among the data points themselves, referred to as autocorrelation. (p. 398) 
Wagner et al. (2002) defined a time series as “a sequence of values of a particular 
measure taken at regularly spaced intervals over time” (p. 299). Moreover, Balogun, 
Awaeyo, and Dawodu (2014) asserted that time series models are used “to obtain an 
understanding of the underlying forces and structure that produced the observed data, and 
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to fit a model and proceed to forecasting, monitoring or even feedback and feedforward 
control” (pp. 1046-1047). 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research questions influence the design of a study and “focus the purpose of the 
study,” whereas hypotheses show the “predictions the researcher makes about the 
expected relationships among variables” (Creswell, 2009, p. 132). This study investigated 
the impact of Zambian agricultural policy on grain trade. It sought to answer and test the 
following research questions and hypotheses:  
Research Question 1 (RQ1): What is the impact of the Zambian food reserve 
agency’s purchases on grain trade? 
Null Hypothesis (H0): The Zambian food reserve agency’s purchases do 
not significantly impact grain trade. 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): The Zambian food reserve agency’s 
purchases significantly impact grain trade. 
Research Question 2 (RQ2): What is the impact of government spending on input 
subsidies on grain trade? 
Null Hypothesis (H0): Government spending on input subsidies does not 
significantly impact grain trade. 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): Government spending on input subsidies 
significantly impacts grain trade. 
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Definition of Variables and Concepts 
 Below are operational definitions of the key variables that I sought to measure 
and analyze in this research: 
Grain Trade 
Grain trading is a step in the agricultural value chain that fulfills the function of 
moving agricultural commodities from areas of surplus to areas of deficit as dictated by 
the market fundamentals of supply and demand (Odozi, 2015). Using price and volume 
signals, grain traders “play a central role in the decisions that producers make about what 
to grow, where and how, in what quantities, and for which markets” (Murphy, Burch, & 
Clapp, 2012, p. 10). Zambian grain is traded in both domestic and export markets. The 
government of Zambia controls the supply and demand of grain in the internal market. 
The government uses both input subsidies and grain purchasing to influence market 
forces and deal with the dilemma of ensuring that food remains affordable in urban 
centers while maintaining incentives for rural farmers to continue the production of key 
grains (Bates & Block, 2013). Agricultural trade flows include both exports and imports 
(Brigham, 2011). 
Zambia adopted two policy choices to influence the international agricultural 
trade: import substitution and export promotion. It is evident that increased export boosts 
the growth of the Zambian economy (Chimfwembe & Seshamani, 2014).  However, the 
imperatives of food security have led the government of Zambia to restrict exports of 
staple crops. This research focused on international grain trade and used data on import 




Governments intervene in the grain market through the creation of strategic grain 
reserve (Mason & Myers, 2013). The main goal of food reserves is to “overcome supply 
shortage in markets as a result of harvest failures or unavailability of international 
supply” (Kornher, Kalkuhl, & Mujahid, 2015, p. 6). In addition, food reserves help 
governments manage price volatility and keep stock that can be distributed to people 
affected by drought, flood or any event that prevents them from having enough food 
(Galtier, 2013). 
Input Subsidies 
Agricultural input subsidies constitute one of the mechanisms for transferring 
public resources to producers in order to reduce farmers’ cost of production and 
encourage the adoption of productivity-enhancing input such as improved seed and 
fertilizer (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013). Policy objectives of agricultural input subsidies in 
developing countries include “short-term private input market development, 
replenishment of soil fertility, social protection for poor subsidy recipients, and national 
and household food security” (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013, p. 22). 
Assumptions 
Agrarian societies engage in export when they produce significant surplus. In fact, 
Saverimuttu and Rempel (2004) analyzed the determinants of grain imports and found 
that “a policy that increased the price farmers receive for food crops, relative to the price 
received for export crops, would reduce the need to import food” (p. 534). This study 
involved an assumption that grain export and import quantities represent the true image 
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of grain trade. The government of Zambia restricts grain trade, especially exports; 
however, it rarely imposes a total ban. From a public policy standpoint, this study reflects 
policy debates that determine the expected outcome of a specific policy action. An 
example of a typical policy question is “what will happen if the Federal Funds rate is 
raised by 25 basis points from its current level, and kept there for two years?” 
(Christiano, 2012, p. 1098).  For this study, the policy question is what will happen to 
grain trade if the Zambian Government changes its spending on input subsidies and the 
amount of government grain purchases. 
The study also involved an assumption that the linear model met is multiple 
regression and the linear model not met is bootstrapped multiple regression (Field, 2013). 
Another key assumption of the model is that there is no autocorrelated errors. This means 
that residues are not correlated.  I used the Durbin Watson test to assess whether 
autocorrelations of a time series were different from zero. In addition, time series analysis 
assumes that data are stationary. This means that data have the same mean, variance, and 
autocorrelation over time (Adhikari & Agrawal, 2013).  Heckman (2003) referred to 
these properties as “the independence and invariance of the mean” (p. 74).  I used the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test to assess the stationarity of each time series. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The government of Zambia uses public expenditure and trade restrictions to 
achieve its agriculture-related goals. This study focused on the two public policy 
instruments that the government uses: spending on agricultural input subsidies and 
government purchases of grains. This means that the study did not investigate the effect 
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of agricultural trade restriction in terms of an export ban or export quota. These export 
bans and quotas are not regular and may only last a few days or a few months, as they 
depend on lobbyists’ efforts to influence “grain import tariffs and export ban for a brief 
time” (Sitko & Jayne, 2011, p. 16). There may be additional factors that impact the 
volume of internationally traded grains that are not necessarily in the public policy realm 
or related to the two predictors of this study. Standard error of estimates account for 
factors “not explained by the equation of the model” used for statistical analysis or 
“uncorrelated white-noise disturbances” (Enders, 2010, pp. 5, 297). 
Limitations 
Grain trading, one of the economic activities that dominate the Zambian formal 
and informal sector, has employed many Zambians since 2002 (Resnick & Thurlow, 
2014). However, available data on import and export of key grain cover the formal 
sector. This means that the study did not cover occasional or ad hoc, informal grain 
traders. This may affect the external validity of the study, in that the extrapolation of 
study results to the whole universe of grain traders may erroneous. However, the study 
population is implicitly defined by the fact that time-series data assume consistency in 
grain trading. 
This study used quantitative methods; therefore, it did not capture opinions and 
interpretations of the study population. A “sequential explanatory strategy “of mixed 
methods would have added qualitative data to explain what the numbers revealed 
(Creswell, 2009, p. 211). Qualitative data would have enabled the study to afford insights 
into causal relationships between Zambian agricultural policy instruments and external 
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trade volumes. A rigorous time-series analysis of data covering a 10-year period 
addressed these limitations. In addition, a political analysis included in the literature 
review dissected the reasons behind specific annual budget allocations and grain 
purchases. 
Population and Sampling Strategy 
Sampling and Sample Size 
To test the impact of Zambian agricultural policy on grain trade, this study used 
data covering 10 agricultural seasons from 2003 to 2012.  The unit of analysis was the 
country year (Zambian market measured on an annual basis). Thus, N was 10 years. I 
used the entire 10-year time series, which enabled the use of standard estimation 
techniques such as “linear interpolation” (Rehfeld, Marwan, Heitzig, & Kurths, 2011, p. 
390). 
Instrumentation 
Data Collection  
I used secondary data that are available from official publications, including those 
of the Zambian Central Statistical Office (CSO), Food and Agriculture Organization 
Corporate Statistical Database (FAOSTAT), and Michigan State University (MSU). Data 
on the dependent variable, international grain trade volumes, came from FAOSTAT, 
whereas data on independent variables came from government databases and other 
publications, including research from Michigan State University that contained time-
series data on the Zambian food reserve agency and input subsidies. The FAOSTAT 
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database is the most comprehensive and widely used for data on agriculture. The Walden 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval number was 06-06-17-0360425.  
Variables. Independent variables included government spending on input 
subsidies and grain volumes that the government-run grain reserve agency bought over a 
10-year period. Government spending was measured in monetary terms (Zambian 
Kwacha), whereas government grain purchases were measured in metric tons. The 
dependent variable was the quantity of internationally traded grain. This variable 
combined both imports and exports, and it was measured in metric tons. 
Procedures. I used time-series data that spanned 10 agricultural seasons from 
2003 to 2012.  These procedures were cost effective because data were readily available 
and I did not need a lot of time and financial resources to collect the data.  This time-
series design advanced knowledge in the public policy arena by predicting the effect of 
the Zambian agricultural policy on grain trade retrospectively (Druckman, 2004).  SPSS 
and Excel software could handle the analysis of causal relationship between variables. 
However, I used Stata because it was required to conduct vector autoregression (VAR) 
analysis. 
Level of measurement. I used ratio variables that had a meaningful zero. These 
variables were also continuous, in that they “can be measured at any level of precision” 
(Field, 2013, p. 10). Thus, “ratio level” of measurement required statistical manipulation 
for analysis (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, p. 147). I used computer software 




This study used time-series data covering 10 Zambian agricultural seasons from 
2003 to 2012.  Data on the dependent variable consisted of the volume of internationally 
traded grains.  This variable combined both import and export of the main grains, 
including maize and rice. The volume of grains was expressed in metric tons.  Data on 
independent variables included volumes that the government of Zambia purchased for its 
strategic grain reserve expressed in metric tons and the amount of money that the 
government spent on input subsidies. This money was expressed in the local currency; 
the Zambian Kwacha.  
I conducted a time-series analysis to draw meaningful inferences from these data. 
Time-series analysis is “the procedure of fitting time series data into a proper model” 
(Adhikari & Agrawal, 2013, p. 15). In addition, Madsen (2008) stated that “time-series 
analysis deals with statistical methods for analyzing and modelling and ordered sequence 
of observations” (p. 1). Analyzing time-series data leads to understanding the underlying 
structure and function that produce the observations. I used descriptive, predictive, and 
prescriptive analytics to describe what happened, forecast what could happen, and advise 
Zambian policy makers on how to achieve their strategic goal of building a private-
sector-led agricultural sector (Tembo, Chapoto, Jayne, & Weber, 2009). Even though 
time-series analysis, also referred to as time-series econometrics, was originally used for 
forecasting, economists have increasingly used it “for the interpretation of economic data 
and hypothesis testing” (Anders, 2010, p. 42). 
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There exist two main time-series models: univariate and multivariate (Adhikari & 
Agrawal, 2013). Univariate refers to a time series that consists of one variable, whereas 
multivariate time series have more than one variable. A multivariate time series that has 
only two variables is termed bivariate. 
Univariate time-series analysis. A univariate time series is a sequence of 
measurements of the same variable collected over time at regular intervals. The 
difference between a univariate time series and standard linear regression is that time-
series data are not necessarily independent or similarly distributed. 
One of the key principles of data analysis is to visually inspect the data of each 
variable separately to assess the variation of each variable before ascertaining the 
covariation of all the variables together (Anders, 2010). I used univariate time series 
analysis to observe the behavior of each variable to determine if there are any unusual 
patterns that can inform subsequent analysis.  This procedure also allows researchers to 
distinguish “stochastic and deterministic” trends of a time series (Anders, 2010, p. 248) 
Decomposition. I used the Moving Average (MA) technique to describe each 
time series.  MA helped with visual inspection of each variable, determining whether the 
appropriate decomposition technique is additive or multiplicative, testing the appropriate 
additive or multiplicative algorithm, and performing statistic tests to verify the correct 
model. Using the Moving Average technique, an analyst can calculate the following:  
1. Trends 
2. Seasonal index 
3. Regression equation 
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4. Forecast future value for each of the variables (trade volumes, FRA purchases, 
and  government expenditure on FISP) 
I used the following classic multiplicative model to get coefficient, constant and 
random matrix for each variable: Y123=TCSI where  
Y1 = Quantity of internationally traded Zambian grain  
Y2 = Government input subsidies  
Y3 = government grain purchases of its strategic reserve 
T = Trend  
C = Cycle 
S = Seasonal effect 
I = Irregular fact (noise or random variation that is unpredictable) 
I used annual data; so, the time series analysis did not include S as annual data do 
not have seasonal effect. 
The linear model was y = b0 + b1(x1) +b2(x2) +b3(x3) +…+bk (xk) where 
y = Trend line estimate of y 
x = Time period 





























 or a = 
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Tests 
Stationarity. Time-series analysis assumes that the dataset is stationary.  
Stationary time series are those whose “mean and variance are constant over a given 
period of time and the covariance between the two time periods does not depend on the 
actual time at which it is computed but it depends only on lag amid the two time periods” 
(Kumar, 2011, p. 10). Stationary series vary around a constant mean level, neither 
decreasing of increasing systematically over time with constant variance. In fact, 
“stationarity of a data series is a prerequisite for drawing meaningful inferences in a time 
series analysis” (Kumar, 2011, p. 10). 
Greene (2003) asserted that different forms of “Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for unit 
roots are an indispensable tool for the analyst of time-series data” (p. 661). I used 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to assess the stationarity of the variables because the time 
series data for this study are parametric as they are ratio data, they assume a normal 
distribution, homogeneous variance. The ADF null hypothesis is that the t-test is 0, 
meaning that there is a unit root. When the t-test is equal to zero, the dataset must be 
transformed to make it stationary. The alternative hypothesis is that the t-test is less than 
zero; meaning that the dataset is stationary and does not need to be transformed.  
Autocorrelation. I used the Durbin-Watson test to assess the presence of 
autocorrelation. Autocorrelation refers to the relationship between a variable and itself 
over period intervals, the level of a variable affects its future level. 
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Multivariate time series. Multivariate time series analysis allows researchers to 
model and explain the interactions and co-movements among a group of time series 
variables. Multivariate analysis also enables researchers to test the effect of multiple 
independent variables on the dependent variable. Multivariate analysis uses “the 
technique of multiple regression” that helps researchers reflect the realities of the real life 
where changes depend on many events acting together (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2008, p. 403). Multiple regression analyzes the effects of multiple 
independent variables on one dependent variable: y=f(x1, x2… xn). 
Multivariate analysis also enables researchers to avoid caveats and conduct 
comprehensive analysis of key phenomenon without conduction multiple and costly 
studies to look at every angle of a social problem. 
Knowing the extent to which each variable drives change or its contribution to the 
change allows researchers to conduct a “utilization-focused” research and analysis 
(Patton, 2002, 173-175). This type of analysis helps stakeholders use the findings to take 
decisions knowing the likely “effect size” attributed to each variable and combination of 
variables (Creswell, p. 157). I also assessed “the combined effect” of all the independent 
variables” by “computing the “coefficient of determination” (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2008, p. 403). 
Covariation. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) asserted that covariation 
exists when two or more variables ‘go together’ or change together in a systematic way” 
(p. 53). Covariates are referred to as predictors in time-series analysis. The main variables 
for the study included a group of independent variables (predicators) consisting of key 
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agricultural policy instruments such as the amount of money allocated to agricultural 
input subsidies and the quantity of grains that the government of Zambia bought for the 
strategic food reserve. The dependent variable consisted the volumes of international 
grain trade that included both imports and exports. I used time-series data that covered 
ten agricultural seasons; from 2003 to 2012.  
I used “multivariate vector autoregressive model” to test the impact of the 
Zambian agricultural policy instruments on grain trade (Hood III, Kidd, & Morris, 2008, 
p. 326). This instrument allows appropriate sequence of time-series datasets. Multivariate 
time-series are also known as vector autoregressive and the main models include Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) and Autoregressive-Moving Average (ARMA). 
The basic model for this research was: 
y = f(x1, x2) where 
y = Quantity of internationally traded Zambian grain 
x1 = Government spending on agricultural input subsidies 
x2 = Quantity of grain purchased by the government’s food reserve agency 
I used vector auto regression (VAR) technique to determine whether government 
spending on input subsidies and the volumes that the food reserve agency buys can be 
used to forecast the level of imports and exports of key grains. VAR is one of the models 
for the analysis of multivariate time series. Chaiechi (2014) stated that “in addition to 
data description and forecasting, the VAR model is also used for structural inference and 
policy analysis” (p. 139).  Stock and Watson (2001) also asserted that econometricians 
use VAR models for “data description, forecasting, structural inference and policy 
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analysis” (p. 101). Christopher A. Sims who introduced VAR suggested three purposes of 
VAR including “forecasting economic time series, designing and evaluating economic 
models, and evaluating the consequences of alternative policy actions” (Christiano, 2012, 
p. 1083). VAR models provide a good fit to macroeconomic data. They are also flexible 
as they “can be conditional on the potential future paths of specified variables in the 
model” (Ozturk & Agan, 2014, p. 7). It has also been argued that “VAR sticks more 
closely to the data than other structuralist models” (Heckman, 2000, p. 49).  
The primary focus was on investigating whether or not correlation between these 
two sets of variables existed. However, as Campbell and Stanley (1963) indicated, 
“correlation does not necessarily indicate causation” (p. 64). Heckman (2000) insisted 
that “a causal interpretation of an empirical relationship is required to evaluate economic 
policies within well-specified model” (p. 46). So this study provided preliminary insights 
that can be used to develop further causal hypotheses between the Zambian agricultural 
policy and grain trade. 
This study used one outcome variable which was continuous. It consisted of 
internationally traded grain volumes. This variable combined both imports and exports of 
key grains including maize and rice. I used two predictor variables including government 
spending on input subsidies and the quantity of grain that the food reserve agency 
purchased over a ten-year period. Field (2013) defined a continuous variable as “one that 




There has been a lot of research on the impact of agricultural subsidies on the 
production, productivity and poverty in Zambia. However, the impact of the key 
instruments of the Zambian agricultural policy on grain trade has not been ascertained. 
The Zambian government uses input subsidies and price stabilization mechanisms to 
support the development of its agricultural sector. These two instruments are supposed to 
increase the volumes of grain traded.  Saverimuttu and Rempel (2004) suggested that 
export parity pricing boosts local production which leads to a surplus. However, 
Caracciolo, Depalo and Macias (2014) found that Zambian agricultural policy forces the 
exit of many international grain traders.  
The best policy outcome makes “at least one person better off while making no 
one worse off” (Mikesell, 2013, p. 22). In the grain industry, government policies may 
affect farmers, traders and consumers. This research on the impact of the Zambian 
agricultural policy on grain trade provided additional empirical evidence that explain and 
predict the indirect effects of the theory of trust or the lack of trust embedded in policies 
regulating the grain industry in Zambia. 
This study fills this gap and raises public policy makers’ awareness of the need to 
consider both intended and unintended consequences during the agricultural policy 
making process. Public and private sectors perform complementary functions to improve 
people’s quality of life. Government policies must strike the right balance between equity 
and efficiency of the marketplace. This research contributes to the existing literature 
about the appropriate role of the public sector and the private sector in supporting key 
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sectors of the economy such as agriculture to create value and sustain social and 
economic development.  
Threats to Validity 
Grain traders in Zambia have different forms including farm gate grain collectors, 
village level grain aggregators, small-scale traders, medium and large size corporations 
that purchase and process grains. This study focused on formal grain trade as it used 
import and export data.  This focus did not consider informal grain trade and internal 
markets. This might dilute the external validity of the study as it could be difficult to 
extrapolate the findings to the entire grain trading industry. To minimize measurement 
error and measure variables accurately, I used ten-year data on international grain trade. 
Ethical Issues 
There are no ethical issues that this study caused as it used data from secondary 
sources. All the data are in the public domain and the study did not collect any views 
from people who might be affected by the findings or conclusions. However, I have spent 
almost ten years supporting agribusiness to source raw materials from smallholder 
farmers and building the capacity of small and medium sized agribusinesses to improve 
their supply chain management. So, my professional biases could be a source of potential 
ethical issue. To mitigate this risk, I used rigorous statistical analysis that focused on 
what the numbers revealed. 
Summary 
The time-series design that uses multivariate analysis enabled me to test the 
effects that the two policy instruments of the Zambian agricultural policy had on grain 
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trade from 2003 to 2012. Vector auto-regression technique allowed me to investigate the 
causal relationships between multiple variables. 
Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
This study was developed to determine the impact of Zambian agricultural policy 
on international grain trade. The study was designed to answer the following research 
questions: 
1. What is the impact of the Zambian food reserve agency’s purchases on grain 
trade? 
The null hypothesis for this question was that the Zambian food reserve agency’s grain 
purchases did not significantly impact grain trade, whereas the alternative hypothesis was 
that the Zambian food reserve agency’s purchases significantly impacted grain trade. 
2. What is the impact of government spending on input subsidies on grain trade?  
The null hypothesis for this question was that government spending on input subsidies 
did not significantly impact grain trade. Its alternative hypothesis was that government 
spending on input subsidies significantly impacted grain trade. 
This chapter contains the results of the data analysis and includes sections on data 
description, assumption testing, and causality inference among variables. Descriptive 
analysis was conducted to visualize trends and develop forecasting equations for each 
variable; the augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test was used to assess the stationarity of 
the time-series datasets; and the Durbin-Watson test helped in detecting the presence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals from a regression analysis. Vector autoregression analysis 
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was used to analyze causal inferences between one dependent variable and two 
independent variables and answer the two research questions. 
Data 
This research and analysis used time-series data covering a 10-year period from 
2003 to 2012, as shown in the table below. These are secondary data from publically 
available sources such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, Michigan State 




FRA purchases in 
metric tons 
FISP in million 
ZMK 
Total international 
grain trade volumes 
2003 54846 98050 182295 
2004 105279 139990 122978 
2005 78666 184050 106399 
2006 389509 204540 174839 
2007 396450 492080 214935 
2008 73876 565120 207859 
2009 198629 589010 72858 
2010 883036 895390 76770 
2011 1751660 500000 505620 
2012 1046000 499970 747603 
Note. Author’s calculations using data from Sitko and Kuteya (2013) and FAOSTAT. 
 
Data Description 
In this analysis, FRA purchases are referred to as FRA, FISP spending is referred 
to as FISP, and international grain trade volume is referred to as Trade. Each of these 





    Variable        Obs        Mean     Std. dev.        Min         Max 
        FRA         10     497795.1     561571.5       54846     1751660 
        FISP         10       416820       253347       98050      895390 
       Trade         10     241215.6     216938.5       72858      747603 
 
The analysis of these data focused on identifying patterns, including trends and 
periodical variations (descriptive statistics); understanding and modeling the data 
(explanatory statistics); and predicting trends from previous patterns (forecasting). After 
summarizing the data, I started plotting observed values for each variable against time to 
visualize the patterns of the data over time. 
Figure 1 shows that FRA purchases almost hit rock bottom in 2008 as the 
government was increasing its budgetary allocations to the Farmer Input Support 
Program. Allocations to FISP started to increase more than ever right after 2008. During 
this year, the country held presidential elections to replace President Levy Mwanawasa, 




















































Figure 2. Trends in government spending on FISP. 
 
In 2010, government spending input subsidies for the FISP program skyrocketed 
as the country headed toward elections. More spending on input subsidies symbolizes 

















































Figure 3. Trends in grain volumes traded internationally. 
 
In 2010, volumes of internationally traded grain bottomed. After that year, they 












































Figure 4. Covariance among variables. 
 
Whereas FRA purchases and FISP spending declined and plateaued after 2011, 
grain trade volumes continued on an upward trend. 
Univariate Time-Series Analysis 
After graphic representation of the data, I proceeded with univariate time-series 
analysis, which is a sequence of measurements of the same variable collected over time at 
regular intervals. One of the key principles of data analysis is visual inspection of the data 
for each variable separately to assess the variation of each variable before ascertaining 
the covariation of all the variables together (Anders, 2010). I used univariate time-series 
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patterns that could inform subsequent analysis.  This procedure also allows researchers to 
distinguish “stochastic and deterministic” trends of a time series (Anders, 2010, p. 248) 
I used a decomposition procedure with the moving average (MA) technique to 
describe each time series.  MA helped with visual inspection of each variable, 
determining whether the appropriate decomposition technique was additive or 
multiplicative, testing the appropriate additive or multiplicative algorithm, and 
performing statistical tests to verify the correct model. Using the MA technique, I was 
able to calculate the following:  
1. Trends 
2. Seasonal index 
3. Regression equation 
4. Future value forecast for each of the variables (trade volumes, FRA 
purchases, and government expenditure on FISP) 
I used the following classic multiplicative model to get coefficient, constant, and 
random matrix for each variable: y123 = TCSI, where  
y1 = Government input subsidies (FISP) 
y2 = Government grain purchases of its strategic reserve (FRA) 
y3 = Quantity of internationally traded Zambian grain  
 
T = Trend  
C = Cycle 
S = Seasonal effect 
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I = Irregular fact (noise or random variation that is unpredictable) 
I used annual data, so the time-series analysis did not include S, because annual 
data do not have seasonal effects. 
The linear model was y = b0 + b1(x1) +b2(x2) +b3(x3) +…+bk (xk) where 
y = Trend line estimate of y 
x = Time period 

























 or a = 





FISP Expenditure in Millions of Zambian Kwacha 











2003 1 98050    82458 
2004 2 139990 119020   117728 
2005 3 184050 162020 140520 1.31 154782 
2006 4 204540 194295 178157.5 1.15 172013 
2007 5 492080 348310 271302.5 1.81 413827 
2008 6 565120 528600 438455 1.29 475252 
2009 7 589010 577065 552832.5 1.07 495343 
2010 8 895390 742200 659632.5 1.36 753001 
2011 9 500000 697695 719947.5 0.69 420488 
2012 10 499970 499985 598840 0.83 420463 
    Total 9.51  
 





y Xy x2 
 
 1 98050 98050 1  
 2 139990 279980 4  
 3 184050 552150 9  
 4 204540 818160 16  
 5 492080 2460400 25  
 6 565120 3390720 36  
 7 589010 4123070 49  
 8 895390 7163120 64  
 9 500000 4500000 81  
 10 499970 4999700 100  
Sum 55 4168200 28385350 385  
Mean 5.5 416820    
 




























 or a = 

 xby  = 416595 
Below is the equation that can be used to predict future value of FISP 
expenditure: 





FRA Purchases in Metric Tons 













2003 1 54846    39398 
2004 2 105279 80063   75626 
2005 3 78666 91973 86018 0.91 56508 
2006 4 389509 234088 163030 2.39 279798 
2007 5 396450 392980 313534 1.26 284784 
2008 6 73876 235163 314071 0.24 53068 
2009 7 198629 136253 185708 1.07 142682 
2010 8 883036 540833 338543 2.61 634315 
2011 9 1751660 1317348 929090 1.89 1258278 
2012 10 1046000 1398830 1358089 0.77 751378 
    Total 11.14  





y xy x2 
 1 54846 54846 1 
 2 105279 210558 4 
 3 78666 235998 9 
 4 389509 1558036 16 
 5 396450 1982250 25 
 6 73876 443256 36 
 7 198629 1390403 49 
 8 883036 7064288 64 
 9 1751660 15764940 81 
 10 1046000 10460000 100 
Sum 55 4977951 39164575 385 
Mean 5.5 497795   
 




























 or a = 

 xby  = 497309 
Below is the equation that can be used to predict future value of FRA purchases: 





International Grain Trade (Import and Export of Key Grains) 











2003 1 182295    145983 
2004 2 122978 152636.5   98481 
2005 3 106399 114688.5 133662.5 0.80 85205 
2006 4 174839 140619 127653.75 1.37 140012 
2007 5 214935 194887 167753 1.28 172121 
2008 6 207859 211397 203142 1.02 166454 
2009 7 72858 140358.5 175877.75 0.41 58345 
2010 8 76770 74814 107586.25 0.71 61478 
2011 9 505620 291195 183004.5 2.76 404903 
2012 10 747603 626611.5 458903.25 1.63 598684 
    Sum 9.99 Total 
    Average 1.25 seasonal index 
Adjustment factor = 1.6016 
 
  x code y xy x2 
 1 182295 182295 1 
 2 122978 245956 4 
 3 106399 319197 9 
 4 174839 699356 16 
 5 214935 1074675 25 
 6 207859 1247154 36 
 7 72858 510006 49 
 8 76770 614160 64 
 9 505620 4550580 81 
 10 747603 7476030 100 
Sum 55 2412156 16919409 385 
Mean 5.5 241216   
 




























 or a = 

 xby  = 241080 
Below is the equation that can be used to predict future value of internationally 
traded grain volumes:  
y3=241080+18x; where y3 is projected internationally traded grain volumes and x 
is the nth year after 2013. 
 After the above univariate analysis, I conducted an analysis of statistical 
assumptions for vector autoregration analysis to ensure that this type of analysis is 
appropriate for each of the variables. 
Evaluation of Statistical Assumptions 
There are two main assumptions for vector autoregression analysis. These include 
stationarity of time series and serial correlation. Before running vector autoregressive 
analysis of time-series data sets, I tested these assumptions using Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test for the stationarity of time series and Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation. 
Stationarity Test 
Drawing inferences from autoregressive models becomes an issue when time-
series datasets have a unit root. Augmented Dickey- Fuller (ADF) is one of the most 
popular test for unit root. The null hypothesis for this test is that the time series has a unit 
root; and the alternative hypothesis is that the time series does not have a unit root. 
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The test value is a negative number. When the ADF test statistic is positive, the 
null hypothesis is automatically accepted and the time series is declared non-stationary 
(Stadnytska, 2010 & Brooks, 2008).  The key characteristic of a stationary time series is 
that it’s “mean, variance, and autocorrelations can usually be well approximated by 
sufficiently long time averages based on the single set of realizations” as they do not 
change over time (Enders, 2010, p. 53-54). 
Table 11 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
                DF-GLS tau       1% critical        5% critical         10% critical 
  [lags]      test statistic         value               value                 value 
 
    11            -2.925             -3.610              -2.763              -2.489 
    10            -2.671          -3.610              -2.798              -2.523 
    9             -2.766          -3.610              -2.832              -2.555 
    8             -3.259           -3.610              -2.865              -2.587 
    7             -3.536           -3.610              -2.898              -2.617 
    6             -3.115           -3.610              -2.929              -2.646 
    5             -3.054            -3.610              -2.958              -2.674 
    4             -3.016             -3.610              -2.986              -2.699 
    3             -2.071             -3.610              -3.012              -2.723 
    2             -1.675             -3.610              -3.035              -2.744 
    1             -1.752             -3.610              -3.055              -2.762 
Note. Opt Lag (Ng-Perron seq t) = 7 with RMSE .0388771. Min SC = -6.169137 at lag 4 
with RMSE .0398949. Min MAIC = -6.136371 at lag 1 with RMSE .0440319. 
 
  ADF value is normally negative. As shown in Table 11, the null hypothesis that 
these time-series datasets have a unit root or are non-stationary can be rejected at 11 and 
8;7;6,5; and 4 lags as they are all more negative than the DF-GLS test statistic at 5% 





 Variable: Food Reserve Agency (FRA). 
 
Table 12 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root in FRA Data         
Number of obs   =         8 
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller 
                  Test           1% critical        5% critical       10% critical 
               Statistic            value               value               value 
 
 Z(t)              2.264             -4.380              -3.600              -3.240 
Note. MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 1.0000. 
 
Test statistic of 2.264 shows that this time series is not stationary. To make it 
stationary, I used the following seasonally adjusted data (deseasonalized) for this 
variable. 
Table 13 

















2003 1 54846    39398 
2004 2 105279 80063   75626 
2005 3 78666 91973 86018 0.91 56508 
2006 4 389509 234088 163030 2.39 279798 
2007 5 396450 392980 313534 1.26 284784 
2008 6 73876 235163 314071 0.24 53068 
2009 7 198629 136253 185708 1.07 142682 
2010 8 883036 540833 338543 2.61 634315 
2011 9 1751660 1317348 929090 1.89 1258278 








Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root in Deseasonalized FRA Data       
Number of obs   =         8 
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller 
                  Test         1% critical       5% critical      10% critical 
               statistic           value             value             value 
 
 Z(t)             -5.381            -4.380            -3.600            -3.240 
Note. MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000. 
ADF test conducted on deseasonalized data shows that the test statistic is -5.381 
which is more negative than the critical value at 5% significance level.  
 Variable: Farmer Input Support Program (FISP). 
 
Table 15 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root in FISP Data         
Number of obs   =         8 
 
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller 
                  Test         1% critical       5% critical      10% critical 
               statistic           value             value             value 
 
 Z(t)             -4.717            -4.380            -3.600            -3.240 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0007 
 
The test statistic is lower or more negative than the critical value. So, this time 
series is stationary. 
 Variable: International grain trade. 
 
Table 16 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit root in International Grain Trade Data         
Number of obs   =         8 
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller 
                  Test         1% critical       5% critical      10% critical 
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               statistic           value             value             value 
 
 Z(t)             -1.631            -4.380            -3.600            -3.240 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.7800 
 
 
This time series is not stationary as the test statistic is higher or less negative than 
the critical value. To make it stationary, I deseasonalized the dataset. 
Table 17 
















2003 1 182295    145983 
2004 2 122978 152636.5   98481 
2005 3 106399 114688.5 133662.5 0.80 85205 
2006 4 174839 140619 127653.75 1.37 140012 
2007 5 214935 194887 167753 1.28 172121 
2008 6 207859 211397 203142 1.02 166454 
2009 7 72858 140358.5 175877.75 0.41 58345 
2010 8 76770 74814 107586.25 0.71 61478 
2011 9 505620 291195 183004.5 2.76 404903 
2012 10 747603 626611.5 458903.25 1.63 598684 
 
Table 18 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root in Deseasonalized International Grain 
Trade Data       
Number of obs   =         8 
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
Z(t)             -4.975            -4.380            -3.600            -3.240 





This time-series variable has become stationary as the test statistic value is more 
than critical value at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. 
Serial Correlation Test 
Serial correlation occurs in time-series when the errors associated with a given 
time period carry over into future time periods. Vector autoregression analysis assumes 
the absence of autocorrelation. Durbin – Watson test helps detect the presence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals from a regression analysis. This test “has been found to be 
quite powerful when compared to others for AR (1) processes” (Greene, 1990, p. 452). 
Table 19 
Durbin-Watson statistic   
      Source          SS        df        MS                Number of obs =      10 
              F (2,     7) =    3.89 
       Model     1.4293e+11      2   7.1465e+10            Prob > F      = 0.0732 
    Residual     1.2869e+11      7   1.8385e+10            R-squared     = 0.5262 
              Adj R-squared = 0.3908 
       Total        2.7162e+11      9   3.0181e+10            Root MSE      = 1.4e+05 
 
       Trade       Coef.     Std. Err.      t     P>|t|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
         FRA    .3478672    .1258216     2.76    0.028      .0503465     .645388 
        FISP   -.1876164    .2003416    -0.94    0.380      -.661349    .2861162 
       _cons    146977.3    86121.33     1.71    0.132     -56667.31    350621.9 
. estat dwatson 
Durbin-Watson d-statistic (3,    10) = 1.461809 
 
The null hypothesis is that there is zero autocorrelation in the residuals and the 
alternative hypothesis is that the residuals are positively autocorrelated. “The Durbin-
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Watson statistic has a distribution of 0≤ d ≤4 with value vary close to 2 indicating no 
serial correlation” (Carson & Munroe, 2005, p.606). A value toward 0 indicates positive 
autocorrelation, while a value toward 4 indicates negative autocorrelation. The Durbin-
Watson statistic of 1.462 suggests that there is zero autocorrelation in the residuals. 
Therefore, at 95% level of significance, we can accept hypothesis that there is no 
autocorrelation.  Moreover, a regression without the intercept term shows d = 1.275. 
Table 20 
Durbin-Watson test in a Regression without Intercept Term 
      Source        SS        df        MS                Number of obs =      10 
              F (1,     8)  =    3.92 
       Model    8.9383e+10      1   8.9383e+10            Prob > F       = 0.0829 
    Residual   1.8224e+11      8   2.2780e+10            R-squared      = 0.3291 
              Adj R-squared = 0.2452 
       Total      2.7162e+11      9   3.0181e+10            Root MSE       = 1.5e+05 
 
 
       Trade       Coef.     Std. Err.       t     P>|t|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
         FRA    .3653054     .139594      2.62    0.031       .043401    .6872098 
        FISP    .0626333    .1519555      0.41    0.691     -.2877767    .4130434 
 
. estat dwatson 
 
Durbin-Watson d-statistic (2,    10) = 1.275174 
 
The Durbin Watson significance table for 2 variables and 10 observations shows 
dl: 0.466 and du: 1.333. Since 1.275 is more than the tabulated lower bound of 0.466, we 
can accept the null hypothesis that there are no autocorrelated errors and conclude that 
there is no first-order correlation.  Even though Kmenta (1986) recommended the 
following decision rules: 
1. Reject if d < dL 
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2. Do not reject if d >dU  
3. The test in inconclusive if dL ≤ d≤ dU 
Banerjee et al. (1993) asserted that when R2 is more than the Durbin-Watson 
statistic, it is an indication that there is “strong autocorrelation in the regression residuals” 
(p.81). In our case, the R
2 value 0.3291 which is less than the d value of 1.275. As there are 
still concerns that the residuals may be serially correlated, I used Prais-Winsten estimator 
to reinforce the conclusion that there is no autocorrelation. 
Table 21 
Prais-Winsten AR (1) regression - iterated estimates 
prais Trade FRA FISP, rhotype (regress) 
 
Iteration 0:  rho = 0.0000 
Iteration 1:  rho = -0.1197 
Iteration 2:  rho = -0.1639 
Iteration 3:  rho = -0.1753 
Iteration 4:  rho = -0.1779 
Iteration 5:  rho = -0.1785 
Iteration 6:  rho = -0.1786 
Iteration 7:  rho = -0.1787 
Iteration 8:  rho = -0.1787 
Iteration 9:  rho = -0.1787 
Iteration 10:  rho = -0.1787 
 
      Source        SS        df       MS                Number of obs =      10 
                   F (2,     7)  =    5.14 
       Model   1.8735e+11      2   9.3673e+10            Prob > F       = 0.0423 
    Residual   1.2760e+11      7   1.8228e+10            R-squared      = 0.5949 
              Adj R-squared = 0.4791 
       Total   3.1494e+11      9   3.4993e+10            Root MSE       = 1.4e+05 
 
 
       Trade       Coef.     Std. Err.      t     P>|t|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
         FRA    .3629159    .1163524     3.12    0.017      .0877861    .6380457 
        FISP   -.1985358    .1842873    -1.08    0.317      -.634306    .2372344 
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       _cons    141705.9    76465.46     1.85    0.106     -39106.16      322518 
 
         rho   -.1786781 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.461809 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.595201 
 
 
The value of the transformed Durbin-Watson is now d=1.595 which is more that 
the upper limit of dU: 1.333 and close of 2. I can now conclude that there is no serial 
correlation. 
Even though time series analysis, also referred to as time series econometrics, was 
originally used for forecasting, economists have increasingly used it “for the 
interpretation of economic data and hypothesis testing” (Anders, 2010, p. 42). I used 
vector autoregression analysis to test the hypothesis underlying each research question of 
this study. I used deseasonalized data for the two variables (FRA and Trade) who time-
series data had to be transformed to meet stationarity conditions. 
Vector Autoregression 
Vector autoregressive models are used to perform four macro-economic tasks 
including “data description, forecasting structural inference, and policy analysis” (Stock 
and Watson, 2001, p. 101). I used vector autogressive analysis to answer research 
questions. 
Table 22 
Modified Data for VAR Analysis 
Year   FRA   FISP   Trade 
2003   39398   98050   145983 
2004   75626   139990  98481 
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2005   56508   184050  85205 
2006   279798  204540  140012 
2007   284784  492080  172121 
2008   53068   565120  166454 
2009   142682  589010  58345 
2010   634315  895390  61478 
2011   1258278  500000  404903 
2012   751378  499970  598684 
Note. FRA and Trade datasets have been seasonally adjusted to meet stationarity 
conditions. 
 
Research Question 1 
Research Question 1 was the following: What is the impact of the Zambian food 
reserve agency’s purchases on grain trade? The Null hypothesis for this question is that 
the Zambian food reserve agency’s purchases do not significantly impact grain trade. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the Zambian food reserve agency’s purchases significantly 
impact grain trade. 
Table 23 
Vector Autoregression for Research Question 1 
Sample:  2004 - 2012                                 No. of obs       =         9 
Log likelihood  = -110.9971                          AIC              = 25.33268 
FPE              = 6.04e+09                         HQIC            = 25.19081 
Det (Sigma_ml)   = 3.02e+09                          SBIC             = 25.39842 
Equation           Parms       RMSE      R-sq       chi2      P>chi2 
Trade                 3       67292.3    0.8991    80.15732    0.0000 
 
       Trade       Coef.     Std. Err.      z     P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
Trade         
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       Trade  
         L1.    1.137868    .1843163     6.17    0.000      .7766148    1.499121     
         FRA    .2996418    .0472647     6.34    0.000      .2070046    .3922789 
       _cons   -87859.87    37444.76    -2.35    0.019     -161250.2   -14469.49 
 
The goodness of fit between observed expected values is significant as the p value 
of chi square is below 0.05. The p value is 0.0000. The result is significant at p < 0.05. 
This means that the FRA purchases significantly impacts grain trade. So, null hypothesis 
is rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted. 
Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 was the following: What is the impact of government 
spending on input subsidies on grain trade?  The null hypothesis for this question is that 
government spending on input subsidies does not significantly impact grain trade; and the 
alternative hypothesis is that government spending on input subsidies significantly 
impacts grain trade. 
Table 24 
Vector Autoregression for Research Question 2 
Sample:  2004 - 2012                                No. of obs      =         9 
Log likelihood = -118.6208                          AIC              = 27.02685 
FPE            = 3.29e+10                          HQIC             = 26.88498 
Det (Sigma_ml) = 1.64e+10                         SBIC             = 27.09259 
Equation           Parms       RMSE      R-sq       chi2      P>chi2 
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Trade                 3        156982    0.4506    7.382846    0.0249 
 
       Trade        Coef.    Std. Err.      z     P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
Trade         
       Trade  
         L1.     1.163747    .4299047     2.71    0.007      .3211496    2.006345 
        FISP     .0371238    .1880317     0.20    0.843     -.3314116    .4056592 
       _cons     9258.806    113850.3     0.08    0.935     -213883.8    232401.4 
 
The goodness of fit between observed expected values is significant as the p value 
of chi square is below 0.05. However, the value of R2 shows that the model describes 
only 45% of the variances in trade volumes. 
The p value is 0.841 which is more than the critical value of 0.05.  The hypothesis 
that government spending on input subsidies does not significantly impact grain trade is 
accepted. 
Overall Research Question 
The overall research question was the following: What is the impact the Zambian 
agricultural policy on grain trade? The null hypothesis was that the key policy 
instruments (FRA and FISP) do not significantly impact grain trade; whereas the 
alternative hypothesis was that these instruments significantly impact grain trade. Below 




Vector Autoregression for the Overall Research Question 
Sample:  2004 - 2012                                No. of obs      =         9 
Log likelihood = -107.7513                         AIC             = 24.83363 
FPE            = 3.82e+09                          HQIC            = 24.64447 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  1.47e+09                         SBIC            =  24.92128 
 
Equation           Parms       RMSE      R-sq       chi2      P>chi2 
Trade                 4       51396.4    0.9509    174.4016    0.0000 
 
       Trade       Coef.     Std. Err.      z     P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
Trade         
       Trade  
         L1.     1.139934    .1285129     8.87    0.000      .8880531    1.391814 
              
         FRA    .3421253    .0357171     9.58    0.000      .2721211    .4121295 
        FISP    -.1878696    .0609097    -3.08    0.002     -.3072503   -.0684888 
       _cons    -19897.25    34163.17    -0.58    0.560     -86855.82    47061.33 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
Trade                 4      105855   0.7918   34.23584   0.0000 
       Trade       Coef.    Std. Err.      z      P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
Trade         
       Trade  
         L1.    1.113002        .2665227       4.18    0.000     .5906273    1.635377 
     logFISP -161231.3     68616.15     -2.35      0.019     -295716.5   -26746.14 
       logFRA_FISP   103226.8     27396.03      3.77      0.000      49531.59      156922 
                  _cons   -492861.2      568451.3   -0.87       0.386      -1607005      621283 
 
The goodness of fit between observed expected values is significant as the p value 
of chi square is below 0.05. The model also describes 95% of data as the R2 = 0.951 
which is higher than the one assigned to any of the two independent variable when 
analyzed alone. This means that combined both variables improved the model. 
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Testing for the statistical significance of each independent variable (testing if the 
unstandardized coefficients are equal to 0 in the population) shows that FRA variable 
coefficient is statistically significant (its p value is 0.000 which is less than the critical 
value of 0.05).  The test also shows that FISP variable coefficient have become 
statistically significant as its p value changed from 0.843 to 0.002 which is less than the 
critical value of 0.05. FRA dominated the combine effect as the p value for the combine 
effect is 0.000. 
The analysis of combined effect of these two policy instruments suggests that 
there are both significant. Unstandardized coefficients indicate how much the dependent 
variable varies with an independent variable.  Calculated coefficients show that for every 
1 MT purchased by FRA, international grain trade increases by 0.342 MT. For every 1 
Kwacha spent on Farmer Input Subsidy Program, international grain trade decreases by 
0.187 MT. 
Therefore, the general form of the equation to predict Zambia’s international grain 
trade from the grain reserve and input subsidy programs is as follows:  
Predicted grain trade (Trade) = -19897.25 + (0.342 x FRA) – (0.187 x FISP) 
Forecasting Horizon 
The Zambian long-term vision is to become “a prosperous middle-income nation 
by 2030” with an agriculture-related goal of “an efficient, competitive, sustainable and 
export led agriculture sector that assures food security and increased income by 2030” 
(Weitz et al., 2015, p.9). Therefore, the forecast from 2013 to 2030 will cover 18 years. 
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Figure 5 shows that grain trade volumes continue to grow if the trends and FRA 
purchases and FISP spending continue. 
Table 26 
Forecast Levels of Grain Trade 
Year FRA FISP Trade varTrade 
2003 39398 98050 145983  
2004 75626 139990 98481  
2005 56508 184050 85205  
2006 279798 204540 140012  
2007 284784 492080 172121  
2008 53068 565120 166454  
2009 142682 589010 58345  
2010 634315 895390 61478  
2011 1258278 500000 404903  
2012 751378 499970 598684 598684 
2013    723289.8 
2014    868444.8 
2015    1037538 
2016    1234516 
2017    1463979 
2018    1731284 
2019    2042670 
2020    2405408 
2021    2827967 
2022    3320210 
2023    3893632 
2024    4561618 
2025    5339763 
2026    6246235 
2027    7302197 
2028    8532300 
2029    9965263 





Figure 5. Forecast grain trade volumes. 
Summary 
This analysis has shown that the combined effect of the two main agricultural 
policy instruments (Food Reserve Agency and Farmer Input Support Program) 
significantly impact grain trade. However, the analysis of individual independent 
variables showed that only the purchases of the Food Reserve Agency significantly 
impact grain trade and that government spending on the Farmer Input Support Program 
does not significantly impact grain trade. 
The next chapter contains a discussion on the above-mentioned findings, 
conclusions that can be drawn from this research and policy recommendations. The 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to determine the impact of the Zambian agricultural 
policy on grain trade. The key policy instruments that served as independent variables 
included the volume of grain that the Zambian Grain Reserve Agency (FRA) purchased 
from the 2002-2003 agricultural season to the 2012-2013 season and government 
spending on the Farmer Input Support Program (FISP) over the same period.  The 
dependent variable consisted on volumes of grain imported in and exported out of 
Zambia from 2003 to 2013. 
This study found out that a combination of these two agricultural policy 
instruments significantly impacted grain trade. The analysis also showed that for every 1 
MT purchased by FRA, international grain trade increases by 0.342 MT, and that for 
every 1 Zambian Kwacha spent on FISP, international grain trade decreases by 0.187 
MT. However, when the impact of these variables is analyzed separately, it becomes 
clear that only FRA purchases significantly impact grain trade. 
Interpretation of Key Findings 
The findings of this study confirm that strong coordination and cooperation 
between “policy games” is crucial to the achievement of policy objectives (Lubell et al., 
2010, p. 289).  Policy games are defined as “arenas of competition and cooperation 
structured by a set of rules and assumptions about how to act in order to achieve a 
particular set of objectives” (p. 289).  The findings revealed that the combined impact of 
the two policy games (i.e., FRA and FISP) on grain trade is significant; however, when 
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these instruments are analyzed individually, only FRA has a significant impact. This is 
because FRA sells its stocks to grain traders in preparation for new harvest seasons. 
These traders export the grain purchased from FRA; hence, the grain reserve becomes a 
transitional storage facility. Sometimes, FRA is also involved in government-to-
government grain export when there is a food crisis in the southern Africa region (Kuteya 
& Jayne, 2012).   
It is also important to note that the analysis showed that FISP has a negative 
impact on grain trade as it reduces trade volumes.  This finding may be further evidence 
that most of the input subsidies in southern Africa are targeted to farmers who can afford 
them and disfranchise smallholder farmers (Burke, Jayne, & Sitko, 2012). This targeting 
may not result in the production of new stocks of grains and may displace private 
investments in agriculture. In fact, Chirwa (2014) asserted that “some FISP inputs are 
diverted or stolen before they reach farmers and some that farmers receive may displace 
unsubsidized purchases that they would have made anyway without FISP” (p. 1). It has 
also been established that “the productivity of subsidized inputs that farmers receive 
depends upon the timing of input receipt, on rainfall, and on the overall management of 
the crop they are applied to” (Chirwa, 2014, p. 1).  
Moreover, the impact ratio for each of the two variables is < 1. According to the 
input-output model, “a small change in important coefficients should have a large impact 
on the output of a related sector” (Aroche & Marquez, 2012, p. 87). Therefore, these two 
instruments still have a long way to go to support Zambia’s vision of having “an efficient, 
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competitive, sustainable and export led agriculture sector that assures food security and 
increased income by 2030” (Weitz et al., 2015, p. 9). 
Political vs. Economic Equilibrium 
FRA as a price stabilization instrument is aimed at rural voters. This policy 
instrument is also aimed at urban voters as FRA offloads its stock to millers at lower than 
its procurement cost to reduce the price of maize flour for urban consumers (Kuteya & 
Jayne, 2012).  FISP is also aimed at rural voters to reduce their cost of production and 
sustain the adoption of improved inputs.  Public spending on these two programs tends to 
increase during an election year. 
FRA uses price signaling to ensure that farmers focus on the type of crops the 
government want to promote. Price mechanisms act as a signal for market-system actors 
to decide on what to produce or purchase. However, in markets that are not competitive, 
this signal becomes artificial because it does not take into consideration the market 
fundamentals of supply and demand. The cost of production and consumer’s willingness 
to pay become out of sync. In this situation, the farming household “separation 
hypothesis” does not hold as farmers fail to use price signaling to increase their 
specialization, hence ending up investing in multiple crops, including those with low or 
negative return on their investments (Kien, 2010, p. 1429). However, when FRA refrains 
from announcing the indicative price and quantities, private sector grain traders increase 
their involvement in purchasing grain from farmers, sometimes at a higher price than that 
of FRA (Cuts, 2016). In addition, grain traders pay cash to farmers immediately, whereas 
FRA does not pay farmers for months (Lair, 2012). 
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Limitations of the Study 
The study used official grain export and import data; therefore, the flow of grain 
through informal cross-border channels was not captured.  This could affect the ability to 
extrapolate the results to the general population of study. However, informal trade is 
difficult to detect, even though it is estimated to be between 10% and 30% of the total 
agricultural trade in Zambia (World Bank, 2014).  
The study is valid because I used tests of stationarity and serial correlation to 
ensure that the data and variables were appropriate for vector autoregression analysis, 
which can also be reliably applied to other time-series datasets. Only one variable was 
stationary, so I had to use deseasonalized data for the other two variables and ran the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test to enhance the analysis of stationarity. I also used Durbin 
Watson to detect serial correlation. 
Recommendations 
Export bans and export quotas are increasingly becoming important tools in 
agricultural policy for many countries in eastern and southern Africa. However, they are 
applied in ad hoc fashion and last a few days or some months, given that they depend on 
lobbyists’ efforts to influence “grain import tariffs and export bans for a brief time” 
(Sitko & Jayne, 2011, p. 16). 
To supplement this study and close other gaps in the existing literature on the 
impact of agricultural policies on integrational grain trade, I recommend further research 
on the optimal policy mix that promotes grain export while assuring that producers sell 
their crops at or below import parity price.  This recommended research would also 
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determine the level of Zambian grain farmers’ competitiveness and provide a market-
related basis for FRA pricing policy.  Saverimuttu and Rempel (2004) analyzed the 
determinants of grain imports and found that “a policy that increased the price farmers 
receive for food crops, relative to the price received for export crops, would reduce the 
need to import food” (p. 534). Import parity pricing is referred to as “a pricing policy 
adopted by suppliers of a good for their sales to domestic customers according to which 
price is set at the opportunity cost of a unit of an imported substitute good;” and “export 
parity pricing is applied when the “price is set at the net proceeds per unit from export 
sales” (Parr, 2005, p. 2).  
Commenting on the calculation of parity prices, Holden (2005) suggested that 
“import parity price includes the world price plus transport costs, insurance and tariffs,” 
whereas “the export parity price … would be the FOB would price at the port of exit” (p. 
357). This means that when domestic prices are above import parity, traders have 
incentives to import. If the target good is more expensive abroad, traders have an 
incentive to export. 
Implications 
This study has the potential to generate impact on the governance of the Zambian 
agricultural sector. Using the findings of this study, government officials can rethink the 
current policy mix and redesign it in a way that can lead to the vision of having “an 
efficient, competitive, sustainable and export led agriculture sector that assures food 
security and increased income by 2030” (Weitz et al., 2015, p. 9). An efficient and 
competitive agricultural sector will not only positively impact the livelihood of the 
97 
 
majority of the Zambian people, but also enhance the profitability of agribusinesses 
operating in Zambia. 
In practice, the ministry of agriculture can use this study and its methodology to 
run multivariate time-series analysis on Zambian investments in different agriculture-
related programs. A constant use of such an analysis will inform the ministry’s allocation 
of resources and ensure that more resources are channeled to high-impact areas such 
postharvest management and extension. 
Conclusion 
Using time-series data on FISP and FRA, which constitute key agricultural policy 
instruments in Zambia, this study has shown that only FRA significantly impacts grain 
trade, FISP does not significantly impact grain trade, and the combined effect of these 
two instruments on grain trade is significant. The study supported a recommendation that 
investment in these instruments be preceded by an empirical analysis of how to positively 
influence the performance of the agricultural sector and achieve its long-term vision. 
Zambian agricultural leaders should use data to decide on the optimal mix of agricultural 
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Appendix: Stata Syntax 
 
1. Data summary 
 
summarize FRA FISP Trade, separator(0) 
2. Trends 
 
twoway (tsline FRA) 
twoway (tsline FISP) 
twoway (tsline Trade) 
twoway (tsline FRA) (tsline FISP) (tsline Trade) 
3. Test for stationarity 
 
dfuller FRA, trend lags(1) 
dfuller FISP, trend lags(1) 
 
dfuller Trade, trend lags(1) 
4. Test for serial correlation 
tsset Year 
regress Trade FRA FISP 
estat dwatson 
regress Trade FRA FISP, noconstant tsscons 
prais Trade FRA FISP, rhotype (regress) 
 
5. Vector autoregression analysis 
 
var Trade, lags(1/1) exog(FRA) 
var Trade, lags(1/1) exog(FISP) 
var Trade, lags(1/1) exog(FRA FISP) 
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var Trade, lags(1/1) exog(FRA FISP) 
 
fcast compute y1_FRA y1_FISP, step(18) 
fcast graph 
